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ARTICLES
PREVENTING WIND WASTE
K.K. DUVIVIER*
The United States has vast offshore wind resources—nearly double the total
electricity consumption of the country—ideally located close to the largest
population centers. This abundance has remained stubbornly untapped for over
a decade, without a single commercial scale wind project built in federal waters
as of early 2021.
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In contrast to obstruction by the Trump administration, President Biden, in
his first days in office, singled out offshore wind development as one of his
priorities for tackling the climate crisis. As a result, the United States may soon
see an offshore wind rush.
Onshore, the United States is a world leader in wind energy, but that
development has come at the price of heavy waste of the resource. A common law
rule of capture, like the one applied in the early days of oil and gas development,
has fostered competitive and protectionist practices. Individual wind developers
have an incentive to maximize energy recovery within their own wind farms, but
they have no incentive to maximize recovery of the entire resource.
There is even more reason than in the oil and gas context to maximize recovery
of the entire U.S. offshore wind resource. While maximizing an oil and gas field
simply contributes more greenhouse-gas-producing product, maximizing carbonfree energy production benefits the U.S. public, as well as the world, by helping
mitigate climate change. Furthermore, offshore wind in federal waters is an asset
collectively owned by all U.S. citizens; maximizing production can generate
maximum payments to the public.
As with oil and gas development, regulation is required to prevent waste and
force consideration of the correlative rights of other developers in a common pool.
Uniformity of ownership by the federal government should facilitate consistent,
cooperative wind development, which is something that is not possible on land
because of the competing priorities of different owners. Lessons learned from
common law waste and state oil and gas waste statutes, as well as the federal
regulations on the topic, can inform the promulgation of regulations that will
best facilitate the development of offshore wind. In this regard, two criteria
should guide offshore wind development—maximizing the quantity of
recoverable resource and avoiding the construction of unnecessary infrastructure
to harvest it.
This Article is the first to address the unique qualities of wind energy
development and comprehensively combine the science with the law. The federal
statute that regulates offshore oil and gas waste is the very vehicle Congress chose
for offshore wind energy development. Consequently, this Article provides a
foundation, first, by exploring the history of waste law in general and then waste
in the context of oil and gas. A thoughtful application of the lessons learned in
those contexts can help transform this federal offshore wind rush into a model
for efficient and climate-friendly wind development worldwide.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
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INTRODUCTION
In 2020, the United States ranked second in the world for installed
wind power capacity.1 Additionally, wind power outranked all other

1. Worldwide Wind Capacity Reaches 744 Gigawatts—An Unprecedented 93 Gigawatts
Added in 2020, WORLD WIND ENERGY ASS’N (Mar. 24, 2021), https://wwindea.org/
worldwide-wind-capacity [https://perma.cc/Y95W-M543]. The countries with the
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U.S. renewable energy resources, both in terms of installed capacity
and the amount of electricity produced.2 U.S. offshore resources are
vast, with a current actual potential of nearly double the total electricity
consumption of the United States.3 Yet, with the exception of two small
pilot projects, one in state and one in federal waters, all U.S. wind
energy production has been onshore or “terrestrial wind.”4
In contrast to the Trump administration’s obstruction of offshore
wind development through restrictions and delayed approvals,5
greatest total installed wind power capacity are China (290,000 megawatts), United
States (122,328 megawatts), and Germany (62,784 megawatts). Id.
2. Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs): What Is U.S. Electricity Generation by Energy
Source?, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Mar. 5, 2021), https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs
[https://perma.cc/58M8-ZJFE]. In 2021, wind power accounted for 8.4% (338 billion
kWh) of all utility-scale electricity generation; hydropower accounted for 7.3% (291
billion kWh); solar accounted for 2.3% (91 billion kWh); and biomass accounted for
1.4% (56 billion kWh). Id.
3. Computing America’s Offshore Wind Energy Potential, OFF. OF ENERGY EFFICIENCY &
RENEWABLE ENERGY, DEP’T OF ENERGY (Sept. 9, 2016), https://www.energy.gov/
eere/articles/computing-america-s-offshore-wind-energy-potential [https://perma.c
c/3XC3-W8RN]. Gross potential is more than five times higher but limited by current
turbine technologies. Id.
4. In May of 1953, Congress passed the Submerged Lands Act, Pub. L. No. 83-31,
67 Stat. 29 (1953), which granted individual states rights to the natural resources of
submerged lands from the coastline to approximately three nautical miles seaward. Id.
§§ 2(a), 3(a). Using its authority under the Submerged Lands Act, Rhode Island issued
a state lease for state-controlled Submerged Land Act areas off Block Island. The Block
Island Wind Farm, which came online in December 2016, was the first U.S. offshore
wind development. Robin Kundis Craig, It’s Not Just an Offshore Wind Farm: Combining
Multiple Uses and Multiple Values on the Outer Continental Shelf, 39 PUB. LAND & RES. L.
REV. 59, 71 (2018). Although some would not characterize it as a pilot because it
provides power to the island, the Block Island Wind Farm is small, involving only five
six-megawatt turbines or a total of thirty megawatts of capacity. Id. Dominion Energy’s
Coastal Virginia Offshore Wind Project (CVOW) is comprised of two six-megawatt
turbines, or a total capacity of only twelve megawatts. Coastal Virginia Offshore Wind
Project (CVOW), BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR,
https://www.boem.gov/renewable-energy/state-activities/coastal-virginia-offshorewind-project-cvow [https://perma.cc/R3JB-758V]. The CVOW is located twenty-seven
miles off the coast of Virginia Beach. Id.
5. See, e.g., Trump’s Ban on Offshore Oil Drilling in Southern States Also Restricts Offshore
Wind, INST. FOR ENERGY RSCH., (Oct. 13, 2020), https://www.instituteforenergy
research.org/fossil-fuels/gas-and-oil/trumps-ban-on-offshore-oil-drilling-in-southernstates [https://perma.cc/FU3H-LR83] (cataloging President Trump’s executive
orders banning new leasing along the coasts of Florida, Georgia, and the Carolinas for
conventional and renewable energy development); Karl-Erik Stromsta, Trump
Administration ‘Slow-Walking’ Offshore Wind Permits: Sen. Whitehouse, GREENTECH MEDIA
(Sept. 29, 2020), https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/trump-
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President Biden, on one of his first days in office, singled out offshore
wind development as one of his priorities for tackling the climate
crisis.6 Consequently, the United States may soon see an offshore wind
rush. There are over 28,000 megawatts of wind capacity proposed for
offshore development, and agreements to purchase offshore wind
generation tripled within one year.7
The “transformed” U.S. perspective of property development and
waste will likely inform the development of wind energy off our coasts
because the federal statute regulating offshore wind development in
the United States permits, and sometimes mandates, changing a
property to maximize its value. The American “transformed” concept
of waste stands in stark contrast to the traditional English law that
prohibited any change. In addition, the federal offshore wind statute
recognizes the “prevention of waste” and the “protection of correlative
rights” as factors that the Secretary of Energy must consider when
approving offshore wind development in federal waters.8 As these
concepts, and the statute itself, arose from oil and gas law, that body of
law can provide precedent for how to treat wind energy development.
First, this Article will start with an analysis of waste’s roots in English
law and early U.S. common law. Second, it will address waste
specifically in the context of state and federal oil and gas law, as well as

administration-slow-walking-offshore-wind-permits-sen-whitehouse [https://perma.c
c/9FYD-3UDB] (contending that federal holdups are delaying wind energy
development).
6. Exec. Order No. 14,008, 86 Fed. Reg. 7,619 (Jan. 27, 2021) (announcing that
the order was passed “with the goal of doubling offshore wind by 2030”).
7. 2019 Wind Energy Data & Technology Trends, OFF. OF ENERGY EFFICIENCY &
RENEWABLE ENERGY, DEP’T OF ENERGY, https://www.energy.gov/eere/wind/2019-windenergy-data-technology-trends [https://perma.cc/S46Q-UWKE] (U.S. offshore wind
energy capacity has grown extensively since 2018, and offshore wind capacity with a
signed offtake agreement, guaranteeing its purchase from an energy buyer, tripled
between 2019 and 2020). An offtake agreement is a contract between a wind company
and an entity that needs the electricity formalizing the buyer’s intent to purchase all
or a set amount of the producer’s future output. What Is Offtake Agreement?, L.
DICTIONARY, https://thelawdictionary.org/offtake-agreement [https://perma.cc/
7A7C-PKF2].
8. Energy Policy Act of 2005, 43 U.S.C. § 1337(p)(4)(C), (G) (“The Secretary
shall ensure that any activity under this subsection is carried out in a manner that
provides for . . . prevention of waste . . . [and] protection of correlative rights in the outer
Continental Shelf . . . .” (emphasis added)). This language arose in the context of oil
and gas leasing, where the concept of waste has a long history. This Article will address
the meaning of “prevention of waste” and “protection of correlative rights” in the
context of offshore wind energy development.
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how waste relates to the doctrine of correlative rights. Third, it will
consider wind energy development and how waste and correlative
rights concepts apply to wind waking in U.S. offshore wind
development.9 Finally, it will provide proposed regulatory approaches
to prevent waste of this valuable climate-friendly public resource.10
I. WASTE LAW
Although U.S. law on waste evolved from English law, the doctrine
took a dramatic turn from protecting preexisting uses of properties to
encouraging uses that developed properties to ameliorate or make
them better. This Part begins with the historical background of waste
in England and then explains how the traditional English doctrine
transformed in U.S. law and how it relates to correlative rights.
A. Historical Background
Waste law, which originated as a term of property law, punishes a
tenant for changes to an estate that detrimentally impact an
inheritance.11 In a comprehensive analysis of early waste law, Rogers v.
Atlantic G. & P. Co.12 defined waste as “[s]poil or destruction done or
permitted to lands, houses, or other corporeal hereditaments, by the
tenant thereof, to the prejudice of the heir or of him in reversion or
remainder.”13 To understand the modern interpretations of waste law
and approach a current definition, it is necessary to explore and
understand the history of how scholars and courts have defined and
applied waste law.

9. Wind turbines affect the air downwind of the blades after the wind has gone
through the turbine, creating wakes like boat wakes in water.
10. This Article focuses on wind waste within offshore areas that Bureau of Ocean
Energy Management (BOEM) has decided to lease. Another issue, beyond the scope
here, is the “upstream” decision, solely in the hands of the federal government, to
decide how much ocean to lease to private developers and whether the wind resource
is wasted if it is not even leased in the first place. Arguably, it is wasteful to only lease
a tiny fraction of that technical capacity, especially where the demand is there and the
need to decarbonize is so acute. It is a somewhat different conceptualization of waste
as compared to that of oil and gas, but it is a worthwhile conversation when (1) the
cost of not exploiting the resource is so severe due to the climate crisis, and (2) the
pressures to not lease an area due to user conflicts and viewshed concerns are so great.
11. RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 56.01 (Michael Allan Wolf
Desk ed., 2021).
12. 107 N.E. 661 (N.Y. 1915).
13. Id. at 661.
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Waste law can be traced back to before the thirteenth century in
early English statutes that contain some of the first references to waste
as a legal term of art.14 The feudal system of governance defined
possession rights, which recognized that different persons could have
separate and distinct interests in the same parcel of land.15 The
concept of waste arose out of the necessity for settling disputes between
differing interests.16 Within the waste concept, Lord Coke interpreted
two English statutes to differentiate between “tenancies for years and
for life.”17
During the nineteenth century, English law expanded on the
concept of waste through a series of essays, treatises, and cases. The
common law recognized waste in three forms: (1) diminishing the
estate’s value, (2) increasing the burden upon the estate, or (3)
impairing the title’s evidence.18 The strict enforcement of waste law
continued, and tenants or life estate owners were held responsible for
“virtually all changes to the landscape.”19 The doctrine of waste at the
time prohibited “converting ancient meadow into arable, or arable or
pasture into wood.”20 Therefore, any type of change to an existing
property or landscape could create waste.21
14. POWELL, supra note 11, § 56.02.
15. Morton Gitelman, The Impact of the Statute of Gloucester on the Development of the
American Law of Waste, 39 ARK. L. REV. 669, 670 (1986).
16. See id. at 671–72 (arguing that “[a] remedy for waste which would provide
damages and amercement [fines] might help prevent injury to land or buildings by
tenants in possession” in lieu of self-help remedies).
17. See Rogers, 107 N.E. at 661 (discussing Lord Coke’s conclusion that the two
statutes applied to permissive waste but noting that “English cases at least raise a doubt
on the point, and there seems to be a distinction between tenancies for years and for
life”).
18. Jill M. Fraley, A New History of Waste Law: How a Misunderstood Doctrine Shaped
Ideas About the Transformation of Law, 100 MARQ. L. REV. 861, 869 (2017) (quoting
GEORGE V. YOOL, AN ESSAY ON WASTE, NUISANCE, AND TRESPASS CHIEFLY WITH REFERENCE
TO REMEDIES IN EQUITY: TREATING OF THE LAW OF TIMBER, MINES, LIGHTS, WATER,
SUPPORT, THE CONSTRUCTION OF PUBLIC WORKS, &C., &C. 2 (London, W. Maxwell
1863)).
19. Id. at 869.
20. Greene v. Cole (1669) 85 Eng. Rep. 1022, 1029 n.5(b).
21. See Fraley, supra note 18, at 877 (explaining that early property boundaries
used descriptive terms to map, so specific landmarks had to be left intact to preserve
the property boundaries). Waste law could be applied whenever a tenant made a
change to a property that would make it more challenging to identify the boundaries
of a property, protecting any possibility of “injury to title.” Id. at 882–84. Many laws at
this time in England were reliant on early methods of surveying the property, and waste
law could be used to protect the evidence of the boundaries of a specific property

8

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:1

B. The American Transformation
While many English laws immediately took hold in American legal
practice, the treatment of waste began to change, leading to the
“transformation” of waste law.22 U.S. state courts typically held that
waste law required some kind of permanent injury or material
prejudice to the inheritance or property in question.23 Somewhere in
the mid-to-late 1800s, U.S. law shifted from a strict application of the

according to the surveillance techniques available. Id. at 879–82. For an example of a
U.S. case based on the same waste principles, see Melms v. Pabst Brewing Co., 79 N.W.
738, 738–39 (Wis. 1899) (“It has been frequently said that this injury may consist either
in diminishing the value of the inheritance, or increasing its burdens, or in destroying
the identity of the property, or impairing the evidence of title. The last element of
injury so enumerated, while a cogent and persuasive one in former times, has lost most,
if not all, of its force at the present time. It was important when titles were not
registered, and descriptions of land were frequently dependent upon natural
monuments, or the uses to which the land was put . . . .”).
22. See generally MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW,
1780–1860, at 30 (1977) (stating that “[b]y 1820 the legal landscape in America bore
only the faintest resemblance to what existed forty years earlier,” signaling a drastic
transformation from English law); Jedediah Purdy, The American Transformation of Waste
Doctrine: A Pluralist Interpretation, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 653 (2006) (providing a thorough
discussion of multiple explanations of economic theories of the transformation of the
law of waste in the United States and concluding that the transformation stems from a
pluralist account while economic theories guide doctrinal interpretation). Some
scholars have rejected the notion that a “transformation” of waste law has occurred in
the United States, instead suggesting that by tracing the history of waste law, its current
treatment aligns with the English common law. See, e.g., Fraley, supra note 18, at 920–
21 (explaining how “[w]aste law has been transformational well beyond its bounds”).
23. See, e.g., Pynchon v. Stearns, 52 Mass. (11 Met.) 304, 312 (Mass. 1846) (stating
that “it is difficult to imagine any exception to the general rule of law, that no act of a
tenant will amount to waste, unless it is or may be prejudicial to the inheritance, or to
those entitled to the reversion or remainder”). Pynchon was probably the turning point
in how American courts applied waste laws because the practices of farmers in the new
American wilderness were different from the way English farmers worked their
established lands. Fraley, supra note 18, at 893–94. Given that the ways in which farmers
changed their use of land did not effectively change the title to lands, the strict
application of English waste laws seemed inappropriate and inefficient. Id. Shortly
after Pynchon was decided, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island held, on similar
grounds to the Pynchon court, that they were “not to apply the English law too strictly”
because “[o]ur lands are in many respects cultivated differently from land in England”
Clemence v. Steere, 1 R.I. 272, 274 (1850). Then, in 1881, the Mississippi Supreme
Court held that the English waste law “test” did not apply because “[t]he condition of
this country and that of England are wholly dissimilar.” Cannon v. Barry, 59 Miss. 289,
303 (1881).
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original English law to a more contextual application, given novel
American land-use situations.24
The oil booms of the early twentieth century drove legislatures and
the judiciary to act to prevent “negligent, opportunistic, or larcenous
acts of a tenant who lacked incentive to maximize presently discounted
long-term returns from the estate, and so took actions inconsistent with
the interest of the reversioner.”25 In Tiffany’s Treatise(s) on Real Property,
the change from English law was noted, stating that
[i]n former times, some acts were regarded as waste merely because
they changed the appearance of the land, and so impaired the
evidence of title thereto, but with the adoption of improved methods
of identifying land, this can no longer be regarded as waste.26

U.S. courts experienced a trend toward restricting the application of
the English law of waste to adapt it to the growth conditions of the
United States and stimulate the development of the land.27
24. Fraley, supra note 18, at 896–98.
25. Purdy, supra note 22, at 675; see, e.g., Rogers v. Atl., G. & P. Co., 107 N.E. 661,
661 (1915) (defining waste as “[s]poil or destruction done or permitted to lands,
houses, or other corporeal hereditaments, by the tenant thereof, to the prejudice of
the heir or of him in reversion or remainder”). The court in Rogers also introduced
two forms of waste: permissive and voluntary. Id. Permissive or negligent waste is “the
mere neglect or omission to do what will prevent injury” and can occur in such
situations as when a house is not maintained and, therefore, falls into a state of
disrepair. Id. Voluntary or actual waste occurs “in the commission of some destructive
act,” such as cutting down timber or destroying a house. Id.
26. 1 HERBERT THORNDIKE TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY AND OTHER
INTERESTS IN LAND 560 (1903) (explaining that land was once defined by surveyable
physical attributes, but given modern surveying techniques, such definitions may not
be necessary).
27. See, e.g., Dixon v. Pugh, 178 P. 880, 881–82 (Okla. 1918) (“The modern rule
that governs in this class of cases is stated by Tiffany in his work on the Modern Law of
Real Property: ‘The question of what constitutes waste is, at the present day,
determined primarily, at least, by the consideration whether the act results in injury to
the inheritance. In former times, some cases are regarded as waste merely because they
changed the appearance of the land, and so impaired the evidence of title thereto;
but, with the adoption of improved methods of identifying lands, this can no longer
be regarded as waste. It was, in part at least, on this principle, that any change in the
character of the land, as of meadow into ar[a]ble land, or arable land into wood, was
formerly regarded as constituting waste, but at the present day such a change would
not be waste, at least in this country, unless it constitute an actual injury to the
inheritance. A merely trifling damage has from early times been regarded as
insufficient to support an action for waste; the judgment being entered for defendant
in case the jury finds for the plaintiff in merely nominal damages. In determining
whether particular acts constitute waste, the condition and usages of the particular
locality are to be considered; a thing thus constituting waste in one locality which is
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In English law, waste law punished any change to the property, even
if the change increased the value of the property in question.28 A strict
application of the English laws of waste would not have fostered the
rapid development of land in the United States, a situation that was
unnecessary in England at the time the waste laws were developed
there.29 Industrial growth in the United States also may have
contributed to a more permissive application of waste law, and U.S.
courts seemed to accommodate greater changes in property than they
previously would have allowed to encourage rapid property
development.30
The established rules on waste began to give way to this new
American doctrine in the late nineteenth century. In the case of Melms
v. Pabst Brewing Co.,31 viewed as “the leading American case” on
ameliorative waste,32 U.S. courts departed further from English law,
where any waste was strictly prohibited.33 In Melms, the defendant
owner of a life estate razed a residence that had become surrounded
by factories and railroad tracks. The remaindermen—those who were
to receive the property after the life estate—sued for waste. The Melms
court held that there was indeed waste because “any change in a
building upon the premises . . . may constitute technical waste,” and

not waste in another. The general tendency of the American courts has been to restrict
the application of the English law of waste, in order to adapt it to the condition of a
new and growing country, and to stimulate the development of the land by the tenant
in possession.’”).
28. RALEIGH COLSTON MINOR & JOHN WURTS, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY (BASED ON
MINOR’S INSTITUTES) § 381 (1909). See generally John A. Lovett, Doctrines of Waste in a
Landscape of Waste, 72 MO. L. REV. 1209 (2007) (exploring the multiple perspectives on
waste law through a description of a multitude of doctrines of waste, stating that
“virtually every property law hornbook or case book will offer some treatment of waste,”
and highlighting the importance of waste a midst legal and political changes).
29. See Dixon, 178 P. at 881–82 (noting that American courts adapted the strict
English law of waste to the growing American economy, which was driven by the
exploitation of natural resources).
30. Id.
31. 79 N.W. 738 (Wis. 1899).
32. DALE A. WHITMAN ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 4.2 (4th ed. 2019); see Thomas
W. Merrill, Melms v. Pabst Brewing Co. and the Doctrine of Waste in American Property
Law, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 1055, 1055 (2011) (“Melms v. Pabst Brewing Co. may be the
most important decision ever rendered by an American court concerning the law of
waste.” (footnote omitted)).
33. See Merrill, supra note 32, at 1058 (noting that prior to Melms, “any material
alteration of property by someone temporarily in possession was regarded as waste,”
but that after Melms, this old rule began to break down (emphasis omitted)).
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the building here was permanently destroyed.34 However, the court
further held that this change would “not be enjoined in equity when it
clearly appears that the change will be, in effect, ameliorating change,
which rather improves the inheritance than injures it.”35 Therefore, as
there was no express or implied obligation in the will to use the
property for a specific purpose or maintain it in its current condition,
Pabst was allowed to commit waste because—due to permanent
changes in the surrounding area from residential to commercial—the
waste would make the property valuable again.36
C. Types of Waste
The modern interpretation of waste law in America became valuedriven.37 Explanations for the shifts and changes in waste law have been
described as stemming from economic, social, and environmental
factors.38 For example, Harold Demsetz proposed that property rights
generally have evolved according to the self-interest of economic
actors.39 Morton J. Horwitz relied on socioeconomics for the
liberalization of English waste law, stating that “an economy
dependent on clearing land for economic development could not

34. Melms, 79 N.W. at 739.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 741 (“[T]he landlord or reversioner . . . is [usually] entitled to receive
the property . . . substantially in the condition in which it was when the tenant received
it; but when, as here, there has occurred a complete and permanent change of
surrounding conditions, which has deprived the property of its value and usefulness
as previously used, the question whether a life tenant . . . has been guilty of waste is . . .
a question of fact for the jury . . . .”).
37. Types of waste include permissive, voluntary, and ameliorative waste. See MINOR
& WURTS, supra note 28, §§ 380–89 (“Voluntary waste is the result of the tenant’s acts
of commission, as the unauthorized destruction of houses or cutting down of trees or
digging of minerals; while permissive waste results from acts of omission or the
negligence of the tenant, as by suffering a house to fall by the neglect of necessary
repairs, or by the negligent breaking of doors, windows, etc., or, possibly, from the
deliberate or negligent act of strangers or from pure accident.”).
38. See, e.g., John G. Sprankling, The Antiwilderness Bias in American Property Law, 63
U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 520–33 (1996) (focusing on the role of law in the destruction of
wilderness land and arguing that an “antiwilderness bias still influences modern
property law,” resulting in the resolution of property disputes in favor of wilderness
destruction).
39. Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 350
(1967).
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enforce a rule of maintaining the existing condition of land.”40 The
following sections will explore physical waste in oil and gas extraction,
as well as how similar economic, social, and environmental drivers have
affected the development of new legal concepts relating to oil and gas
waste.
In its early days, oil development was characterized by “profligate
drilling and tremendous physical waste.”41 After “Colonel” Edwin
Drake in Pennsylvania discovered that oil could be extracted by
drilling, he “sparked a local oil boom that spread throughout
Pennsylvania and into nearby states.”42 About forty years later, oil was
discovered in Spindletop, Texas, and the number of wells exploded
from thirteen to over four hundred in just eight months.43 In both
locations, the rapid expansion led to physical, economic, social, and
environmental waste.44 Physically, spilled oil pooled in unlined pits,
causing leakage into ground water and evaporation into the air.45
With respect to economics, overproduction meant unstable prices:
at one point, oil was selling for three cents per barrel while water was
40. Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation in the Conception of Property in
American Law, 1780–1860, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 248, 279 (1973); see also Purdy, supra
note 22, at 696–98 (providing multiple explanations of economic theories of waste
transformation in America, and concluding that the transformation stems from a
pluralist account while economic theories guide doctrinal interpretation); Cities
Serv. Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas Co., 340 U.S. 179, 187 (1950) (allowing an early
examination of social influence of law which strayed from the strict legal reasoning
analysis that existed previously).
41. Howard R. Williams, Conservation of Oil and Gas, 65 HARV. L. REV. 1155, 1159
(1952).
42. Ian McCabe, Achieving U.S. Energy Autonomy: The Problems, Solutions and Side
Effects of Weaning the American Economy off Foreign Oil, 3 APPALACHIAN NAT. RES. L.J. 169,
170 (2009).
43. JUDITH WALKER LINSLEY ET AL., GIANT UNDER THE HILL: A HISTORY OF THE
SPINDLETOP OIL DISCOVERY AT BEAUMONT, TEXAS IN 1901, 12 (2002).
44. See Jacqueline Lang Weaver, The Tragedy of the Commons from Spindletop to Enron,
24 J. LAND, RES., & ENV’T L., 187, 187–88 (2004) (documenting the rapid growth and
rampant waste of early extraction); see also David E. Pierce, Minimizing the Environmental
Impact of Oil and Gas Development by Maximizing Production Conservation, 85 N.D. L. REV.
759, 759 (2009) (discussing the transition “of rights in oil and gas reservoirs away from
capture rights and toward correlative rights” with the result that “state oil and gas
conservation commissions can [maximize] development of the oil and gas resource . . .
while minimizing the impact on surface and other natural resources”).
45. Weaver, supra note 44, at 187–88 (explaining how “[t]he waste in our oil fields
in the first decades of the twentieth century was staggering. Torrents of oil ran down
creeks and streams or were put in earthen storage subject to fire, evaporation, and
floods”).

2021]

PREVENTING WIND WASTE

13

selling for five cents per cup in the same towns.46 Aside from the
physical and economic waste, these booms had serious social and
environmental impacts, upending communities and allowing the
uncontrolled release of fluids and gases that burned or poisoned
humans and animals.47
When the shift of focus on resource extraction broadens from simply
the economic as between the correlative parties extracting a resource
to also include broader societal and environmental factors, regulators
can play a significant role.48 Thus, state governments began to
intervene to address the problem of waste in oil and gas development.
Some of the first statutes prohibited actions that caused physical waste,
such as allowing an oil well to ignite or to gush.49 Others addressed
economic waste by limiting production.50 Eventually, pooling and wellspacing regulations were added to encourage maximum reservoir

46. DANIEL YERGIN, THE PRIZE: THE EPIC QUEST FOR OIL, MONEY & POWER 70 (2008).
47. See Elliff v. Texon Drilling Co., 210 S.W.2d 558, 559, 563 (Tex. 1948)
(discussing liability for gas blowout poisoning neighbor’s cattle). See also LINSLEY ET AL.,
supra note 43, at 121, 126, 164–67.
48. See Cont’l Oil Co. v. Oil Conservation Comm’n, 373 P.2d 809, 818 (N.M. 1962)
(“The prevention of waste is of paramount interest, and protection of correlative
rights is interrelated and inseparable from it. The very definition of ‘correlative rights’
emphasizes the term ‘without waste.’ However, the protection of correlative rights is a
necessary adjunct to the prevention of waste. Waste will result unless the commission can
also act to protect correlative rights.” (emphasis added)); see also Cities Serv. Gas Co. v.
Peerless Oil & Gas Co., 340 U.S. 179, 185 (1950) (“It is now undeniable that a state
may adopt reasonable regulations to prevent economic and physical waste of natural
gas.”); Peter D. Junger, The Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation Act: Private Rights and
Public Policy, 13 WYO. L.J. 1, 5 (1958) (“The purpose of the Compact is to ‘conserve oil
and gas by the prevention of physical waste thereof from any cause.’”); Barton H.
Thompson, Jr., Resource Use and the Emerging Law of “Takings”: A Realistic Appraisal, 42
ROCKY MT. MIN. L. INST. 2, 2–22 (1996).
49. See Legislation: Oil and Gas Conservation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 1137, 1138–40 (1930)
(detailing legislative efforts in Arkansas, Louisiana, and Oklahoma); Thomas A.
Mitchell, The Future of Oil and Gas Conservation Jurisprudence: Past as Prologue, 49
WASHBURN L.J. 379, 414 (2010) (noting the creation of a Pennsylvania regulatory
authority after the 1984 Oil and Gas Act); Phillip E. Norvell, The History of Oil and Gas
Conservation Legislation in Arkansas, 68 ARK. L. REV. 349, 357–61, 370 (2015)(noting that
Oklahoma and Texas were among the first states to pass market-demand proration
statutes).
50. See Junger, supra note 48, at 5–6 (explaining that the Interstate Oil Compact
Commission aimed to conserve gas by preventing physical waste); Norvell, supra note
49, at 365 (articulating that Arkansas attempted to “confront the problem of waste” by
conserving oil and gas); ARK. CODE ANN. § 15-72-101 (2021) (attempting to eradicate
the “evils” of oil and gas use by prohibiting waste and ratable production).
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development.51 Although mineral owners challenged many of these
regulations as unconstitutional “takings,” the U.S. Supreme Court
upheld Ohio’s regulations as a valid exercise of the state’s police
power, noting that the legislative power “can be manifested for the
purpose of protecting all the collective owners, by securing a just
distribution, to arise from the enjoyment by them, of their privilege to
reduce to possession, and to reach the like end by preventing waste.”52
By the 1930s, five states had created oil and gas conservation
commissions or delegated responsibility to existing commissions to
regulate oil and gas operations.53 By the early 1950s, the majority of oilproducing states passed comprehensive conservation legislation,54
many following the 1949 model legislation the Interstate Compact to
Conserve Oil and Gas,55 which focused on correlative rights and
preventing waste.56 Today, there is some form of oil and gas
conservation regulation in every oil and gas producing state.57

51. Spacing designates the number of wells over an oil and gas reservoir and the
density which they can be drilled for conservation purposes. Pooling refers to the
combination of small tracts among adjacent owners to conform to the spacing pattern
in order to receive a permit. PATRICK H. MARTIN ET AL., MANUAL OF OIL AND GAS TERMS
727, 1072–73 (Fred D. Nation, Jr., et al. eds., 7th ed. 1987).
52. Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190, 210 (1900); see also Knighton v. Texaco
Producing, Inc., 762 F. Supp. 686, 689 (W.D. La. 1991), aff’d, 988 F.2d 1209 (5th Cir.
1993) (“If Louisiana had adopted the rule in an unmodified form, an owner could
have drilled as many wells on his land as he cared to drill. To avoid actual or perceived
drainage, however, his neighbor could have drilled as many retaliatory wells as he
deemed necessary . . . . Society would not tolerate the unbridled lust for oil and gas to
dissipate a natural resource. The property owner’s unlimited right to explore had to
be curtailed in the name of conservation. Thus, exercising its police power to prevent
waste, the Louisiana Legislature passed conservation measures that were, and are,
administered by the Department of Conservation, headed by a Commissioner of
Conservation.” (emphasis added)).
53. Robert E. Hardwicke, The Rule of Capture and Its Implications as Applied to Oil and
Gas, 13 TEX. L. REV. 391, 419–20 (1935); see A.W. Walker, Jr., Property Rights in Oil and
Gas and Their Effect Upon Police Regulation of Production, 16 TEX. L. REV. 370, 380–81
(1938); see also Kemp Wilson, Conservation Acts and Correlative Rights: Has the Pendulum
Swung Too Far?, 35 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 18-1, 18-2 (1989).
54. 6 EUGENE KUNTZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS, PARTS 1 & 2 (2000).
55. Joint Resolution Consenting to an Interstate Oil Compact to Conserve Oil and
Gas, H.R.J. Res. 407, 74th Cong. 49 Stat. 939, 940 (1935).
56. Id.; Blakely M. Murphy, The Administrative Mechanism of the Interstate Compact to
Conserve Oil and Gas: The Interstate Oil Compact Commission, 1935–1948, 22 TUL. L. REV.
384, 387, 392 n.22 (1948).
57. NANCY SAINT-PAUL, 1 SUMMERS OIL & GAS § 4:2 (3d ed. 2019).
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Conventional oil and gas deposits involve fugacious resources, or
those that can flow through porous rocks.58 The original concept of
ownership rights for developing these fugacious resources was the rule
of capture.59 As traditionally taught to first-year law students, the rule
of capture describes “[t]he principle that wild animals belong to the
person who captures them, regardless of whether they were originally
on another person’s land.”60 As relevant here, it is a “fundamental
principle of oil-and-gas law[,] holding that there is no liability for
drainage of oil and gas from under the lands of another so long as
there has been no trespass and all relevant statutes and regulations
have been observed.”61
Applying the rule of capture to determine property rights over
subsurface minerals involves two steps. First, application of the ad
coelum62 doctrine, which provides that an owner of a surface estate also
owns everything directly above and below the surface.63 Second,
application of the principle that the surface owners can drill a well
vertically anywhere within the boundaries of their lands and take
possession of oil and gas resources from neighboring lands that might
flow into that well from the common reservoir.64 Thus, the rule of
58. Richard J. McLaughlin, Foreign Access to Shared Marine Genetic Materials:
Management Options for a Quasi-Fugacious Resource, 34 OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L. 297, 298
(2003). Note, however, that some shale oil deposits are so viscous (so-called
“unconventional” shale oil deposits) that they are not fugacious. See ALAN J. MACFAYDEN
& G. CAMPBELL WATKINS, Petroleum and the Petroleum Industry: What Are They?, in
PETROPOLITICS 3, 3, 17 (2014).
59. See, e.g., Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Tr., 268 S.W.3d 1, 42 (Tex.
2008) (Johnson, J., concurring in part) (“The rationale for the rule of capture is the
‘fugitive nature’ of hydrocarbons”).
60. Rule of Capture, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
61. Id.
62. Bury v. Pope (1587), 78 Eng. Rep. 375, Cro. Eliz. 118 (KB). The phrase is
commonly attributed to Lord Coke, but without a doubt it is more ancient in
derivation than even the later usage in Bury in 1587. See Herbert David Klein, Cujus Est
Solum Ejus Est . . . Quousque Tandem?, 26 J. AIR L. & COM. 237, 237–38 (1959)
(describing the etiology of the Latin phrase epitomizing the ad coelum doctrine).
63. See Klein, supra note 62, at 237–38. Cuius est solum, ejus est usque ad
coelum et ad inferos has been translated from the Latin by various authorities as, “‘[h]e
who owns the soil owns everything above (and below), from heaven (to hell)’ or
‘[w]hose is the soil, his it is up to the sky’ or ‘[h]e who possesses the land possesses
also that which is above it’ or ‘[h]e who has a right to the soil has a right even to the
sky’ or ‘[w]hose is the land, his is also what is above (and below) it.’” See id.
64. A.W. Walker, Jr., Nature of the Landowner’s Interest in Oil and Gas, 17 MONT. L.
REV. 22, 24–25 (1955). In certain states, title to the oil and gas is obtained through
severance at the surface and not the location of the mineral originally under
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capture incentivizes owners to drill anywhere on their properties, and
with whatever density they can manage, to capture as much of the
common reservoir as they can.65 However, the rule of capture fails to
protect the rights of other landowners who have common ownership
to oil in the reservoir.
D. Correlative Rights
In addition to the waste to society and the environment, wasteful
practices also resulted in losses to the property rights of adjacent
owners.66 The concept of correlative rights first evolved to protect the
economic interests of these adjacent owners.67 Thus, at the time that
U.S. waste law was evolving in the context of property held by those
with life estates in contrast to remaindermen, another concept of waste
was evolving between holders of “correlative rights” in the context of
oil and gas extraction.68

neighboring land. For example, compare Texas’s adoption of the ownership in place
theory with Oklahoma’s adoption of the qualified ownership theory. 1 HOWARD R.
WILLIAMS ET AL., WILLIAMS & MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 204 (2020).
65. Alabama v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 84 F.3d 410, 413 (11th Cir. 1996). The
rule of capture allowed “invasion” of the property of adjacent landowners and was only
limited by the possibility that the adjacent landowners also had the right to capture as
many of your minerals as they could. See, e.g., R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Manziel, 361
S.W.2d 560, 568–69 (Tex. 1962) (stating that it is “relevant to consider and weigh the
interests of society . . . against the interests of the individual”); Brown v. Humble Oil &
Refin. Co., 83 S.W.2d 935, 940 (Tex. 1935) (holding that a landowner’s rights are
limited only by the adjoining landowner’s ability to capture the oil and gas first).
66. See, e.g., Elliff v. Texon Drilling Co., 210 S.W.2d 558, 563 (Tex. 1948).
67. Id. at 562.
68. See generally David E. Pierce, Developing a Correlative Rights Doctrine to Accommodate
Development of Oil and Gas in Arkansas, 68 ARK. L. REV. 407, 410–11 (2015)) [hereinafter
Pierce, Developing Correlative Rights](explaining the advance of correlative rights
doctrine in Arkansas relating to natural resources); Pierce, supra note 44, at 778–79
(proposing a shift towards correlative rights doctrine as a way to better manage oil and
gas resource while minimizing environmental harm); David E. Pierce, Resolving IntraReservoir Horizontal Drilling Conflicts Using a Reservoir Community Analysis, 90 N.D. L. REV.
249, 250–51 (2014) (explaining the disconnect in classic trespass doctrine with the
geological structure of oil and gas reservoirs); Lewis M. Andrews, The Correlative Rights
Doctrine in the Law of Oil and Gas, 13 S. CAL. L. REV. 185, 192–94 (1940) (cataloguing
the origin of the correlative rights doctrine in the United States); Walter L. Summers,
The Modern Theory and Practical Application of Statutes for the Conservation of Oil and Gas,
13 TUL. L. REV. 1, 4 (1938) (“[T]he legal relations of a landowner respecting oil and
gas should be such as to encourage their production and consumption, but at the same
time safeguard the interest of the public against loss of their economic values through
wasteful production methods, and afford some proportionate adjustment of these

2021]

PREVENTING WIND WASTE

17

Extraction of minerals from a common reservoir creates an
inevitable conundrum: any extraction by one owner of land necessarily
impacts other landowners with property rights in the same reservoir.69
Consequently, the concept of “correlative rights” arose.70
Correlative rights represent the landowners’ privileges against one
another, whose property bears a common fugacious resource, in
lawfully taking only their proportional share of the resource.71 If one
owner within the pool commits waste, it can imperil the correlative
rights of others, and there is an obligation to develop one’s interest
with due regard for the interests of the others in the pool.72 Each
mineral owner has both a coequal interest in the common subsurface
resource and must respect the rights of the other owners of that
resource.73
The common law first recognized correlative rights, not in the
context of oil and gas but instead in the context of water or under lands
within the same watershed.74 Early water law gave owners of land

values between the owners in a common source of supply.”); Sidney J. Strong,
Application of the Doctrine of Correlative Rights by the State Conservation Agency in the Absence
of Express Statutory Authorization, 28 MONT. L. REV. 205, 205–06 (1967) (“The term
‘correlative rights’ may be said to encompass the land-owner’s legally protected
interest in the oil and gas beneath his property.”).
69. Eugene Kuntz, Correlative Rights in Oil and Gas, 30 MISS. L.J. 1, 6 (1958)
(describing the likely conflict when landowners extract minerals from a common
reservoir under the rule of capture).
70. Id. at 1–2, 7.
71. See id. at 1–2. Correlative rights can be established by the common law or by
statute. See, e.g., LA. STAT. ANN. § 31:9 (2020) (“Landowners and others with rights in a
common reservoir or deposit of minerals have correlative rights and duties with
respect to one another in the development and production of the common source of
minerals.”).
72. See Kuntz, supra note 69, at 2–3.
73. See Tara K. Righetti, The Incidental Environmental Agency, 2020 UTAH L. REV. 685,
706 (2020); see also Yael R. Lifshitz, The Geometry of Property, U. TORONTO L.J.
(forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 27–28), https://www.utpjournals.press/
doi/abs/10.3138/utlj-2020-0059 [https://perma.cc/L8TZ-JRZB] (providing a good
example of the premise that vertical property regimes need to adapt when applied to
a horizontal resource).
74. The doctrine of correlative rights to water involved not only surface water
flowing in streams but also related groundwater. See, e.g., Vill. of Tequesta v. Jupiter
Inlet Corp., 371 So. 2d 663, 667–68 (1979) (“The right of the owner to ground water
underlying his land is to the usufruct of the water and not to the water itself . . . . The
right to use water does not carry with it ownership of the water lying under the
land . . . . This ‘right of user’ may be protected by injunction, or regulated by law, but
the right of user is not considered ‘private property’ requiring condemnation
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bordering streams a right to use some of that water in its natural state.75
This riparian regime allowed for use of the stream as long as it did not
alter the flow or the quantity or quality of the water for downstream
users.76 This “natural flow theory” allowed only limited use and was
replaced in most states that follow this streamside riparian rights water
law by the doctrine of “reasonable use.”77
Under reasonable-use riparian regimes, water rights were still tied to
the banks of a river or stream.78 However, owners of land bordering
the stream were permitted to use the water so long as their use did not
negatively impact the correlative rights of all other riparian landowners
along that same watercourse to extract their equal shares.79 Professor
Christine A. Klein nicely summarizes the doctrine of reasonable use as
follows:
The determination of reasonableness is correlative, considering the
reasonableness of a particular use not only in isolation, but also in
comparison to other potentially reasonable uses of water. The
calculus depends upon an evaluation of factors such as the purpose
of the use, the economic and social value of the use, and the extent
of harm it causes to other riparian users and, more recently, to the
environment.80
proceedings unless the property has been rendered useless for certain purposes.”
(citing Tatum Brothers, Real Est. & Inv. Co. v. Watson, 109 So. 623, 626 (Fla. 1926);
Pounds v. Darling, 77 So. 666, 669 (Fla. 1918); Broward v. Mabry, 50 So. 826, 827 (Fla.
1909)).
75. A. DAN TARLOCK ET AL., WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT: A CASEBOOK IN LAW AND
PUBLIC POLICY 126–27 (5th ed. 2002).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 122, 127.
78. Id. at 126–27.
79. Joseph W. Dellapenna, The Right to Consume Water Under “Pure” Riparian Rights,
in 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 7.02(a)(2) (Robert E. Beck & Amy K. Kelly eds.,
2007).
80. Christine A. Klein et al., Modernizing Water Law: The Example of Florida, 61 FLA.
L. REV. 403, 407 (2009) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 850A (AM. L. INST.
1979)); see also Harris v. Brooks, 283 S.W.2d 129, 136 (Ark. 1955) (citing the principle
that owners may use water to the extent that it is not detrimental to rights of other
riparian owners); Mason v. Hoyle, 14 A. 786, 791 (Conn. 1888) (supporting the right
to use water to one’s best advantage, but not to render downstream parties’ rights
useless or unproductive); Hoover v. Crane, 106 N.W.2d 563, 565 (Mich. 1960) (citing
the principle that when evaluating reasonable use, courts should consider, among
other factors, use, extent, and duration). In times of shortage, all riparians share the
limited water supply. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 850A cmt. a (asserting that
during “drought or temporary water shortage, it is usually reasonable to require the
water and the harm to be shared” among landowners along the same watercourse); see
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The doctrine of correlative rights to prevent a neighbor from doing
harm to one’s use of water migrated over to a similar right to prevent
harm to a neighbor’s right to oil and gas resources.81 The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court was one of the first courts to liken damage of oil and
gas development to damage of groundwater resources.82 One of the
first Texas cases to address correlative rights for oil and gas resources,
Elliff v. Texon Drilling Co.,83 cited the groundwater-based Pennsylvania
authority to support its holding.84
Part of the beauty of correlative rights is the doctrine’s straddle
between the “compartmentalized notions of exclusive ownership” and
the sharing of “property held as a commons.”85 This creates an
“‘intermediate stage’ between the commons and fully individualized
property [that] may induce a group to preserve a resource and to
‘avoid dissipating time and effort—and the resources themselves—in
unproductive disputes and wasteful attempts to grab the most.’”86
also Erin Ryan, A Short History of the Public Trust Doctrine and Its Intersection with Private
Water Law, 38 VA. ENV’T L.J. 135, 183 (2020).
81. Walker, supra note 64, at 23; see also Hague v. Wheeler, 27 A. 714, 717 (Pa.
1893).
82. Hague, 27 A. at 717 (“Notwithstanding the fugitive nature of oil and gas, I think
it will not be doubted that if a party by negligent operations upon adjacent land injures
the flow of oil wells . . . he would be liable in damages to the well owners so injured.
Such a liability as to wells of water was established . . . and the right to gas or oil would
seem to be of as high a character as the right to water.” (citing Collins v. Chartiers Val.
Gas Co., 18 A. 1012 (Pa. 1890))).
83. 210 S.W.2d 558 (Tex. 1948).
84. Id. at 562 (“No owner should be permitted to carry on his operations in
reckless or lawless irresponsibility, but must submit to such limitations as are necessary
to enable each to get his own.”). Interestingly, the doctrines have been applied in both
directions. Hague applied groundwater correlative rights theory to oil and gas, but
more recently, the Texas Supreme Court has applied oil and gas correlative rights
theory to groundwater. See Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 369 S.W.3d 814, 830, 832
(Tex. 2012) (holding, as a matter of common law, groundwater in Texas is owned just
as oil in the ground is owned in place even though either may be drained). But cf. City
of Lubbock v. Coyote Lake Ranch LLC, 440 S.W.3d 267, 274–75 (Tex. App. 2014)
(stating that “simply because a landowner may own the groundwater beneath his land
in a manner similar to the way in which a landowner owns oil and gas beneath his land
does not necessarily translate into the analogy being taken further” to support an
extension of the accommodation doctrine to the groundwater context).
85. Tara K. Righetti, Correlative Rights and Limited Common Property in the Pore Space:
A Response to the Challenge of Subsurface Trespass in Carbon Capture and Sequestration, 47
ENV’T L. REP. 10,420, 10,432–34 (2017) (arguing that application of the correlative
rights doctrine would result in the most effective development of subsurface pore
space for geologic carbon sequestration).
86. Id. at 10,433 (footnote omitted).
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However, the breadth of correlative rights was irregular. The
common law concepts of correlative rights varied depending upon the
ownership interest in the resource.87 Under the common law, injury to
the common resource appeared to be a prerequisite to recovery for an
aggrieved neighbor. For example, the Texas Supreme Court noted in
Elliff:
While we are cognizant of the fact that there is a certain amount of
reasonable and necessary waste incident to the production of oil and
gas to which the non-liability rule must also apply, we do not think
this immunity should be extended so as to include the negligent
waste or destruction of the oil and gas.88

Thus, under the common law rule of correlative rights, owners’
rights to extract oil and gas from their property, as well as to capture it
from their neighbors’ properties, did not give them absolute rights.
“The opportunity to capture a just and equitable share of a resource is
only valuable to the extent that others in the resource are precluded
from diminishing that right. Thus, correlative rights in oil and gas arise
from, and are subordinate to, the concept of prohibition of waste.”89
Regulation was designed to protect correlative rights, and the
common law regime of oil and gas regulation has primarily shifted to
a statutory scheme.90 Statutes created some of the parameters to
determine what was “reasonable and legitimate drainage from the
common pool” without resorting to extensive litigation to determine
87. Elliff, 210 S.W.2d at 561 (“In Texas, and in other jurisdictions, a different rule
exists as to ownership. In our state the landowner is regarded as having absolute title
in severalty to the oil and gas in place beneath his land. The only qualification of that
rule of ownership is that it must be considered in connection with the law of capture
and is subject to police regulations.” (citing Lemar v. Garner, 50 S.W.2d 769 (Tex.
1932)); Humphreys-Mexia Co. v. Gammon, 254 S.W. 296 (Tex. 1923); Waggoner Est.
v. Sigler Oil Co., 19 S.W.2d 27 (Tex. 1929); Texas Co. v. Daugherty, 176 S.W. 717 (Tex.
1915); Brown v. Humble Oil & Refin. Co., 83 S.W.2d 935, 940 (Tex. 1935)). It is beyond
the scope of this article to address the various property regimes for surface or
groundwater or for oil and gas in various states. Many of them are now controlled by
legislation. See generally Kerstin Mechlem, Groundwater Governance: The Role of Legal
Frameworks at the Local and National Level—Established Practice and Emerging Trends, 8
WATER 347 (2016). Likewise, legislation or regulations might best clarify the property
ownership status of wind rights.
88. Elliff, 210 S.W.2d at 562.
89. Righetti, supra note 85, at 10,435 (footnotes omitted).
90. Marvin W. Jones, Groundwater Fair Share, in CHANGING FACE OF WATER RIGHTS
ch. 8, 8.1–II (2019) (“[C]orrelative rights arise from ownership. They are not created
by regulation; instead, regulation must be designed to protect these rights.” (emphasis
omitted)).
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whether it constituted waste that would subject an operator to potential
liability.91 Initially, legislators justified their intervention by invoking
the protection of private correlative rights.92 Gradually, regulators
successfully married correlative rights to the public good of preventing
waste.93 Definitions of correlative rights link the concept to waste:
Correlative rights when used with respect to lessees of adjacent leases,
means the right of each lessee to be afforded an equal opportunity
to explore for, develop, and produce, without waste, minerals from a
common source.94

The following section, drawing on a fifty-state survey of oil and gas
waste statutes in the United States, will tease out some of the key
elements of these state statutory definitions of waste.
II. STATE RESPONSES TO ONSHORE WASTE
Although the term waste is not easily defined, in the oil and gas
context it means the loss of potentially recoverable oil and gas
products, and “[t]he prevention of waste is conservation.”95 Although
environmental waste has received increased recognition in recent
91. Elliff, 210 S.W.2d at 562 (“These laws and regulations are designed to afford
each owner a reasonable opportunity to produce his proportionate part of the oil and
gas from the entire pool and to prevent operating practices injurious to the common
reservoir. In this manner, if all operators exercise the same degree of skill and
diligence, each owner will recover in most instances his fair share of the oil and gas.”).
92. Pierce, Developing Correlative Rights, supra note 68, at 409 (explaining that,
initially, property owners viewed regulation based on the protection of private
property rights as less intrusive than regulation for an indefinite public good); see also
Bandini Petroleum Co. v. Superior Ct., 284 U.S. 8, 20–21 (1931) (“The District Court
of Appeal apparently thought it doubtful whether the State might restrict or regulate
the production of oil or gas ‘on the theory of the public’s interest in their natural
resources’ . . . .”).
93. See, e.g., Bandini, 284 U.S. at 22 (“If the statute be viewed as one regulating the
exercise of the correlative rights of surface owners with respect to a common source
of supply of oil and gas, the conclusion that the statute is valid upon its face . . . is fully
supported by the decisions of this Court.”); Champlin Refin. Co. v. Corp. Comm’n of
Okla., 286 U.S. 210, 233–34 (1932) (upholding a proration order on public right to
prevent waste).
94. 30 C.F.R. § 205.105 (2010) (emphasis added); see also WYO. STAT. ANN. § 30-5101(a)(ix) (2021) (“‘Correlative rights’ shall mean the opportunity afforded the
owner of each property in a pool to produce, so far as it is reasonably practicable to do
so without waste, his just and equitable share of the oil or gas, or both, in the pool . . . .”
(emphasis added)); NEB. REV. STAT. § 57-903(1), (6) (2021); NEV. REV. STAT. § 522.021
(2021); UTAH CODE ANN. § 40-6-2(2) (LexisNexis 2021); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 29, § 503(3)
(2021); WASH. REV. CODE § 78-52.010(19) (2021).
95. 8 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW SCOPE (2020).
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years,96 most oil and gas law sources recognize two main forms of
“waste” addressed above: physical waste and economic waste.97
A. The Model Act
All oil and gas producing states have statutes defining “waste,” yet
the items included vary from state to state.98 Many states have
formulated a definition based upon the Model Oil and Gas
Conservation Act (“Model Act”), drafted by the Interstate Oil and Gas
Conservation Commission:
“Waste” means:
(A) the inefficient, excessive, or improper use of reservoir energy or
unnecessary dissipation of reservoir energy;
(B) the inefficient storing of oil or gas;

96. See, e.g., Patrick Siler, Note, Hydraulic Fracturing in the Marcellus Shale: The Need
for Legislative Amendments to New York’s’ Mineral Resources Law, 86 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 351,
355, 369–70, 376–77, 382 (2012) (discussing, inter alia, how legislatures should
broaden the definition of waste to include environmental waste); see also Michael
Pappas, Anti-Waste, 56 ARIZ. L. REV. 741, 745 (2014) (enumerating five societal values
to define waste: “(1) economic efficiency; (2) human flourishing; (3) concern for
future generations; (4) stability and consistency; and, (5) ecology”). To illustrate
different perspectives on waste, Pappas reiterates an excerpt from Marc Reisner’s
Cadillac Desert where Mulholland says not damming and flooding Yosemite Park for
hydropower is “goddamned waste!” Id. at 743 n.3.
97. Pappas, supra note 96, at 743 n.3.
98. ALA. CODE § 9-17-1(20) (2021); ALASKA STAT. § 31.05.170(15) (2021); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 27-501(20) (2021); ARK. CODE ANN. § 15-72-102(15) (2021); CAL.
PUB. RES. CODE § 3300 (West 2021); COLO. REV. STAT. § 34-60-103(11–13) (2021); FLA.
STAT. § 377.19(31) (2021); GA. CODE ANN. § 12-4-42(17) (2021); IDAHO CODE § 47310(32–33) (2021); 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 725/1 (2021); IND. CODE § 14-37-7-3.5(a)
(2021); IOWA CODE § 458A.2(19) (2021); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 55-602 (2021); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 353.520(2) (West 2021); LA. STAT. ANN. § 30:3(16) (2021); MD. CODE ANN.
ENV’T § 14-404 (West 2021); MISS. CODE ANN. § 53-1-3(l) (2021); MO. REV. STAT.
§ 259.050(15) (2021); MONT. CODE ANN. § 82-1-101(16)(a) (2021); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 57-903(1)(a); NEV. REV. STAT. § 522.039; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 70-2-3 (2021); N.Y. ENV’T
CONSERV. LAW § 23-0101(20) (McKinney 2021); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113-389(14) (2021);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-08-02 (2021); OR. REV. STAT. § 520.005(15) (2021); 58 PA. STAT.
AND. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 402(2) (West 2021); S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-43-10(A) (2021); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 45-9-2(15) (2021); TENN. CODE ANN. § 60-1-101(13) (2021); TEX. NAT.
RES. CODE ANN. § 85.046 (West 2021); UTAH CODE ANN. § 40-6-2(2); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
29, § 503(27); VA. CODE ANN. § 45.1-361.1 (2021); WASH. REV. CODE § 78.52.010(23);
W. VA. CODE § 22-6-1 (2020); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 30-5-101(a)(i) (2021). Compare N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 113-389(14) (listing several definitions of waste, including underground
waste); with N.Y. ENV’T CONSERV. LAW § 23-0101(20) (providing a definition of waste
that does not include underground waste).
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(C) the locating, drilling, equipping, operating, or producing of an
oil or gas well in a manner that causes or tends to cause a reduction
in the quantity of oil or gas ultimately recoverable from a reservoir
under prudent and proper operations, the drilling of unnecessary
wells, or the loss or destruction of oil or gas either at the surface or
below the surface;
(D) the production of oil or gas in excess of pipeline, marketing, or
storage capacities, in excess of reasonable market demand, in excess
of the amount reasonably required for properly drilling,
completing, testing, or operating a well or other facilities for
recovering, processing, or transporting oil, gas, or by-products, or in
excess of the amount otherwise utilized on the acreage from which
the oil or gas is produced; or
(E) other dissipation, production, or use of oil or gas underground
or above ground, or in storage, that is careless, needless, or without
valuable result.99

It is obvious when states base their statutes on the Model Act because
of the repetition of language from subsection (A), notably “inefficient,
excessive, or improper” use.100 Of the thirty-six states with readily
identifiable definitions of “waste,” twenty-nine utilize some, if not all,
of the language from the Model Act.101
This analysis will focus on three of the five Model Act provisions: (1)
unnecessary dissipation of reservoir energy—subsection (A) in the

99. MODEL OIL AND GAS CONSERVATION ACT § 1(24) (INTERSTATE OIL & GAS
COMPACT COMM’N 2004).
100. Id.
101. The twenty-nine states are: Alabama, ALA. CODE § 9-17-1(20)(a), Alaska,
ALASKA STAT. § 31.05.170(15)(A), Arizona, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 27-501(20)(b),
Arkansas, ARK. CODE ANN. § 15-72-102(15)(A), Florida, FLA. STAT. § 377.19(31)(a),
Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. § 12-4-42(17)(A), Idaho, IDAHO CODE § 47-310(33), Iowa,
IOWA CODE § 458A.2(19)(b), Louisiana, LA. STAT. ANN. § 30:3(16)(a), Mississippi,
MISS. CODE ANN. § 53-1-3(l)(i), Missouri, MO. REV. STAT. § 259.050(15)(b), Montana,
MONT. CODE ANN. § 82-11-101(16)(a)(ii), Nebraska, NEB. REV. STAT. § 57-903(1)(a),
Nevada, NEV. REV. STAT. § 522.039(1), New Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 70-2-3(A), New
York, N.Y. ENV’T CONSERV. LAW § 23-0101(20)(b), North Carolina, N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 113-389(14)(a), North Dakota, N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-08-02(19)(b), Oregon,
OR. REV. STAT. § 520.005(15)(a), Pennsylvania, 58 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 192(f), South Carolina, S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-43-10(A)(2), South Dakota, S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 45-9-2(15)(b), Texas, TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 85.046(a)(7),
Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. § 40-6-2(29)(a), Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 29, § 503(27)(A),
Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. § 45.1-361.1, Washington, WASH. REV. CODE
§ 78.52.010(23)(b), West Virginia, W. VA. CODE ANN. § 22-6-1(v), Wyoming, WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 30-5-101(a)(i)(B).
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model definition; (2) reduction in the quantity ultimately
recoverable—subsection (C) in the model definition; and (3)
production in excess of reasonable market demand—subsection (D)
in the model definition. This analysis will also address another
provision within subsection (C) of the model definition—(4) “the
drilling of unnecessary wells”—which evokes societal, as well as
economic, concerns.102
1. Dissipation of reservoir energy
Conventional oil and gas deposits involve underground traps.103 Oil
and gas migrate through porous rocks until they encounter a
nonporous and impervious formation, which then traps the oil and gas
in a reservoir.104 Although the reservoir exists within the tiny spaces of
a porous rock, it also is often layered with salt water (because oil evolves
from marine deposits), oil, and then gas on top and infused
throughout the oil.105 The water and gas in the deposit create pressure
that traditionally assists in recovery by “propel[ling] the oil or gas to
the well bore.”106
102. MODEL OIL AND GAS CONSERVATION ACT § 1(24)(c) (INTERSTATE OIL & GAS
COMPACT COMM’N 2004).
103. This contrasts with unconventional deposits, such as shale oil or tight gas that
could not be exploited until the development of hydraulic fracturing, threedimensional seismic, and directional drilling. See, e.g., K.K. DUVIVIER, ENERGY LAW
BASICS 273–78 (2017).
104. Edwin Cey et al., Oil Formation, ENERGY EDUC. (Jan. 4, 2019),
https://energyeducation.ca/encyclopedia/Oil_formation [https://perma.cc/2XDP5JST].
105. Natural Gas Explained, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Dec. 9, 2020),
https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/natural-gas [https://perma.cc/VMS6-VGJJ].
106. HOWARD R. WILLIAMS & CHARLES J. MEYERS, MANUAL OF OIL AND GAS TERMS 922
(Patrick H. Martin & Bruce M. Kramer eds., 10th ed. 1997) (defining “reservoir
energy”); see 1 NANCY SAINT-PAUL, SUMMERS OIL AND GAS § 4:27 (3d ed. 2020) (“In the
states defining the waste of oil and gas as including the waste of reservoir energy, the
conservation agencies have the authority to make rules and regulations governing the
use of reservoir energy, including the authority to require gas-oil ratios and to fix those
ratios . . . . These statutes were directed principally to preventing the waste of gas in
the production of oil and authorized conservation agencies to fix gas-oil production
ratios. Some of these statutes defined waste as including the waste of gas energy and
water drive.”); Note, Conservation of Natural Gas and the Federal-State Conflict, 64 COLUM.
L. REV. 888, 898 (1964) (“[M]ost conservation statutes include in the definition of
waste the inefficient, improper, or excessive dissipation of reservoir energy. Reservoir
energy includes, in addition to gas pressure, water motivated by hydrostatic pressure,
gravitational force, and expansion of reservoir oil upon the release of pressure.”
(footnotes omitted)); Owen L. Anderson & Ernest E. Smith, Exploratory Unitization

2021]

PREVENTING WIND WASTE

25

When a reservoir is depleted too quickly, natural gas pressure
experiences accelerated dissipation and salt water can mix with the
oil.107 As a result, much of the oil that could have been captured may
be stranded underground.108
Because efficient primary recovery drilling techniques allow
exploitation of a deposit over a shorter period of time, they also reduce
total development and operating expenses.109 Aside from extra
expenses, attempting to recover additional oil after the primary phase
requires additional expenditures of energy.110 Perhaps most
Under the 2004 Model Oil and Gas Conservation Act: Leveling the Playing Field, 24 J. LAND
RES. & ENV’T L. 277, 278 (2004) (“The resulting ‘flush’ production that resulted from
the drilling of too many wells inefficiently dissipated the natural reservoir energy that
pushed the oil and gas through the reservoir and into well bores, thereby causing
underground waste. Because of this rapid dissipation of internal reservoir pressure,
hydrocarbons that would otherwise have been produced became unrecoverable.”);
Brad Secrist, Note, Not All “Units” Are Created Equal: How Hebble v. Shell Western E &
P, Inc. Missed an Opportunity to Curb the Expansion of Fiduciary Obligations in Oklahoma Oil
and Gas Law, 65 OKLA. L. REV. 157, 159 (2012) (“Over-drilling can also damage the
natural reservoir energy necessary to extract the oil and gas and result in irreparable
damage to the recoverability of valuable hydrocarbons. Once the natural reservoir
energy has dissipated, extraction of the oil or gas often becomes economically
unfeasible.”).
107. See Righetti, supra note 73, at 693.
108. Id. Through careful preservation of pressure, a gas-cap driven well can yield oil
recoveries of twenty-five to fifty percent, and water driven wells can recover seventy-five
to eighty percent of the oil in a reservoir. JACQUELINE LANG WEAVER, UNITIZATION OF
OIL AND GAS FIELDS IN TEXAS: A STUDY OF LEGISLATIVE, ADMINISTRATIVE, AND JUDICIAL
POLICIES 12–13 (1986); see also AM. PETROLEUM INST., STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF CRUDE
O IL R ECOVERY AND R ECOVERY E FFICIENCY 15 (2d ed. 1984), https://
pslcolombia.com/documentos/BULL%20D14%20Statistical%20Analysis%20of%20
Crude%20Oil%20Recovery%20and%20Re1.pdf [https://perma.cc/5VL4-99N3]. A
key mechanism adopted by regulators to avoid the unnecessary dissipation of reservoir
energy is the “maximum efficient rate of production” or MER. WEAVER, supra note 108,
at 14. If an operator adheres to the MER for a particular well, it should result in a
maximum rate of ultimate recovery of oil for the entire reservoir. Exceeding the MER
results in waste. Id. Sometimes, oil left in a field can be collected through secondary
recovery operations. Id. Secondary recovery usually involves the injection of gas or
water in five spot patterns with the injection wells on the outside and the recovery or
producing well in the center. Id. at 16. Secondary recovery is “a poor substitute for
producing oil efficiently from the start.” Id. at 17.
109. Id. at 17–18.
110. Enhanced oil recovery includes a variety of processes that go beyond
traditional primary and secondary recovery methods. Enhanced Oil Recovery, OFF. OF
FOSSIL ENERGY & CARBON MGMT., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, https://www.energy.gov/
fe/science-innovation/oil-gas-research/enhanced-oil-recovery
[https://perma.cc/
JL2H-MT98]; Klaas van ‘t Veld & Owen R. Phillips, The Economics of Enhanced Oil
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importantly, improper primary recovery techniques may have injured
the geologic formation, which, along with price considerations, may
make secondary recovery completely infeasible.111
In conclusion, because of the mechanics of how oil is produced and
the composition of salt water, oil, and gas in each separate reservoir,
dissipation of reservoir energy can result in considerable waste or loss
of the resource.
2. Reduction in the quantity ultimately recoverable
There are other ways that valuable resources, like oil and gas, may
be unnecessarily left in the ground. Fires and explosions in early oil
fields caused damage not only to improvements on the surface but also
to the subsurface oil resources.112 For example, in Elliff v. Texon Drilling
Co., a sudden uprush of uncontrolled flow from an oil well, or
“blowout,” on the defendant’s land constituted a violation of plaintiff’s
correlative rights.113 As the Elliff court noted:
[N]otwithstanding the fact that oil and gas beneath the surface are
subject both to capture and administrative regulation, the
fundamental rule of absolute ownership of the minerals in place is
not affected in our state. In recognition of such ownership, our
courts, in decisions involving well-spacing regulations of our
Railroad Commission, have frequently announced the sound view
that each landowner should be afforded the opportunity to produce his fair
share of the recoverable oil and gas beneath his land, which is but another
way of recognizing the existence of correlative rights . . . .114

Part of allowing operators to recover their “fair share” is to seek “the
largest ultimate recovery.”115 Thus, every state statute including this
Recovery: Estimating Incremental Oil Supply and CO2 Demand in the Powder River Basin, 31
ENERGY J. 31, 32 (2010).
111. WEAVER, supra note 108, at 17.
112. See, e.g., People’s Gas Co. v. Tyner, 31 N.E. 59, 59 (Ind. 1892) (enjoining a
landowner from using nitroglycerin to extract natural gas because the explosive would
“greatly injure and damage” the land above and below the earth’s surface); Wronski v.
Sun Oil Co., 279 N.W.2d 564, 570–71 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979) (evaluating the damage
caused by an oil company’s illegally produced wells); Elliff v. Texon Drilling Co., 210
S.W.2d 558, 559 (Tex. 1948) (determining damages to a neighbor’s land from wells
that blew out and caught fire).
113. Elliff, 210 S.W.2d at 562–63.
114. Id. at 562 (emphasis added).
115. OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 86.2(A) (2021). Note, however, that in 2019, Colorado
shifted focus away from maximum production and amended the definition of waste so
that waste “[d]oes not include the nonproduction of [oil or] gas from a formation if
necessary to protect public health, safety, and welfare, the environment, or wildlife
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language from the Model Act identifies unnecessary actions that “cause
a reduction in the quantity of oil or gas ultimately recoverable from a
reservoir” as waste.116
The Model Act seems expansive in its inclusion of several actions
that might reduce the quantity of resource ultimately recoverable,
"specifically locating, drilling, equipping, operating, or producing . . .
[a] well.”117 The first item in the list—well location—is “the second
important factor in increasing recovery rates.” Consequently, orders by
regulatory agencies addressing well location can significantly decrease
waste.118
Three primary techniques for determining well locations have been
used in the oil and gas context. One of the first techniques that was
used in the oil and gas context is set spacings between wells (or well
spacings) without particular regard to a geologic formation.119 The
second is pooling, which is the “process of combining small tracts into
an area of sufficient size to merit a well permit under the field’s
applicable spacing rule.”120
Third is “unitization,” which is “the process of combining all or a
large part of the acreage of an entire field into a unit” where owners of
the separate tracts overlaying the reservoir participate in joint and
coordinated operation of the field.121 Unitization is more efficient and
economical than the other two strategies of spacing or pooling,122 and
unitized fields have achieved dramatically improved recovery rates,

resources as determined by the [Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation] commission.”
COLO. REV. STAT. § 34-60-103(11)(b) (2021).
116. MODEL OIL AND GAS CONSERVATION ACT § 1(24)(C) (INTERSTATE OIL & GAS
COMPACT COMM’N 2004). See also supra Section II.A.1 (discussing controlling
production rates through MER as one of the primary ways to maximize recovery in an
oil and gas context).
117. MODEL OIL AND GAS CONSERVATION ACT § 1(24)(C) (INTERSTATE OIL & GAS
COMPACT COMM’N 2004).
118. WEAVER, supra note 108, at 13–14. The first factor is rate of production. Id. at
13.
119. In Texas, the typical statewide spacing rule is one oil well per 40 acres and one
gas well per 640 acres. Id. at 21.
120. Id. at 7, 21.
121. Id.; see also 30 C.F.R. § 250.2(jjj) (1986) (“‘Unitization’ means the combining
or consolidation of separately owned lease interests for the joint exploration or
development of a reservoir or potential hydrocarbon accumulation under the terms
of a unit agreement.”). Unitization is not currently defined under 30 C.F.R. § 550.105.
122. WEAVER, supra note 108, at 25.
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reducing physical waste.123 In addition, if the entire deposit is not
considered as a unit, then the other two techniques well spacing and
pooling—can result in an unfair allocation of the increased recovery
that these rules can make possible. Thus, compulsory unitization offers
the best strategy for addressing the tension between conservation and
correlative rights.124
A second component of subsection (C) of the Model Act includes
actions that not only actually cause “a reduction in the quantity of oil or
gas ultimately recoverable from a reservoir,” but also actions that tend
to cause a reduction in the quantity of oil or gas ultimately recoverable
from a reservoir.125 Thus, the Model Act seems to broaden its scope to
cover not only situations where causation is proved but also to those
where the actions might “tend[] to cause” reductions. To balance this
comprehensive coverage, however, the Model Act provides some
protection for an extractor. Immediately following the “tend[] to
cause” wording, the Model Act adds the phrase “under prudent and
proper operations,”126 thus injecting a “prudent operator” negligence
standard potentially weakened by poor industry practices.
States vary in how broadly or narrowly they have chosen to modify
the model language to protect different actors. For example, at least
six states place a heavier burden on the party extracting by making
them responsible for any “locating, spacing, drilling, equipping,
operating or producing . . . in a manner that results or may result in
reducing the quantity . . . ultimately recoverable” without any
additional language about “prudent and proper operations.”127
3. Production in excess of reasonable market demand
While dissipation of a well’s pressure and reduction in the quantity
of the resource ultimately recoverable directly address physical waste,
regulating oil and gas production to address market demand is entirely
different. These provisions address economic waste by permitting

123. Id. at 29 & n.36 (citing MID-CONTINENT OIL & GAS ASS’N, HANDBOOK ON
UNITIZATION OF OIL POOLS 44–55 (1930) (noting recovery of oil in Cromwell field
would be doubled with unitization)).
124. Id. at 25, 29–33 (explaining why a compulsory unitization process is needed).
125. MODEL OIL AND GAS CONSERVATION ACT § 1(24)(C) (INTERSTATE OIL & GAS
COMPACT COMM’N 2004).
126. Id.
127. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 520.005(15)(a) (2021); ALASKA STAT. § 31-05170(15)(A) (2021); ARK. CODE ANN. § 15-72-102(15)(A) (2021); COLO. REV. STAT. § 3460-103(13)(a)(II) (2021).

2021]

PREVENTING WIND WASTE

29

regulators to “proration,” or restrict production, based on market
demand.128
The glut of oil in East Texas in the early 1930s resulted in a sharp
decline in the price per barrel.129 By May of 1931, when the first
prorationing orders were issued, East Texas oil production
represented one-third of U.S. consumption.130 However, the price of
oil in East Texas at that time was ten cents per barrel in contrast to the
price of one dollar per barrel just the year before.131 Some courts struck
down the early prorationing rules because the rules’ objective was to
raise the price of oil, not to prevent physical waste. The latter of which
was the scope of the regulating agency’s authority under the Texas
statute.132 However, once the Texas legislature explicitly granted the
authority for market demand prorationing, the practice of
prorationing was upheld.133

128. 8 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW SCOPE (2020) (defining prorationing
as the “[r]estriction of production by a state regulatory commission, usually on the
basis of market demand [wherein] [t]he commission determines what amount shall
be produced in a state during a given period of time and then allocates this total
amount among the producing fields in the state”); see also 16 Tex. Admin. Code
§ 3.38(a)(3) (defining prorationing units as “[t]he acreage assigned to a well for the
purpose of assigning allowables and allocating allowable production to the well”).
Historically, using the geographic surface area of a tract or portion of a tract as a factor
in allocating the volume of oil or gas to be produced from a well arose from the way
in which proration of oil and gas production developed in the early part of the 20th
century. Robert G. Hargrove & Ana Maria Marsland, Proration Units: “You keep using
that word, I don’t think it means what you think it means!” (Apr. 20, 2018).
129. J. Howard Marshall & Norman L. Meyers, Legal Planning of Petroleum Production,
41 YALE L.J. 33, 38 (1931). See generally DAVID F. PRINDLE, PETROLEUM POLITICS AND THE
TEXAS RAILROAD COMMISSION 19–55 (1981) (describing the history of oil and gas
politics from 1930 to 1935); Robert E. Hardwicke, Legal History of Conservation of Oil in
Texas, 1938 A.B.A. SEC. MIN. L. 214–68 (describing the history of oil conservation in
Texas); WEAVER, supra note 108, at 37–68 (explaining the early history of Texas
legislation and unitization).
130. Hardwicke, supra note 129, at 232.
131. Cf. CHARLES A.S. HALL & KENT KLITGAARD, ENERGY AND THE WEALTH OF NATIONS
234 (2d ed. 2018).
132. See, e.g., MacMillan v. R.R Comm’n of Texas, 51 F.2d 400, 402, 405 (W.D. Tex.
1931), rev’d sub nom. R.R. Comm’n of Texas v. MacMillan, 287 U.S. 576
(1932); People’s Petroleum Producers, Inc. v. Smith, 1 F. Supp. 361, 365 (E.D. Tex.
1932).
133. See, e.g., Flannery v. State, 85 S.W.2d 1052, 1053 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935) (holding
that a statutory authority to limit the production of crude petroleum oil more than
reasonable market demand grants the power to enact orders to that end).
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The goal of market demand prorationing was “to provide price
stability to oil and gas producers who faced cycles of boom and bust
under the unbridled rule of capture.”134 In contrast to restrictions on
oil production to prevent physical waste and protect reservoir integrity,
market demand prorationing restricts production below the maximum
efficient rate (MER) levels to prevent oversupply in a market that
might result in lower prices.135
Although there are formal definitions of economic waste that are
distinct from physical waste, many state oil and gas statutes blur the
definitions.136 Yet, several state statutes specifically include provisions
like subsection (D) of the Model Act that defines waste as including
production “in excess of . . . [the] reasonable market demand.”137
Regulating commissions may not have the power to proration or take
other measures to address the economic impacts of oil and gas
production in the absence of such explicit language.138 This could
explain why legislatures at one time expressly included this authority
in the statutes.139

134. 2 ERNEST E. SMITH & JACQUELINE LANG WEAVER, TEXAS LAW OF OIL AND GAS
10.131(B)(1) (2d ed. 2021).
135. Id. at 10.1(B)(1); see also Danciger Oil & Ref. Co. v. R.R. Comm’n of Texas, 49
S.W.2d 837, 843 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932) evaluating the effects of over production on
market prices), rev’d sub nom, Danciger Oil & Ref. Co. of Texas v. R.R. Comm’n of
Texas, 56 S.W.2d 1075 (Tex. 1933). But cf. Champlin Ref. Co. v. Corp. Comm’n of
Okla., 286 U.S. 210, 236–37 (1932) (market demand prorationing was upheld on the
basis that it prevented physical waste). The Maximum Efficient Rate of production or
MER was discussed above and represents the maximum rate at which oil can be
produced in a field without injury to the reservoir based on engineering studies. See
supra note 108. See generally SMITH & WEAVER, supra note 134 (explaining the concepts
of MER and Market Demand); Maximum Efficiency Rate, PETROPEDIA,
https://www.petropedia.com/definition/7510/maximum-efficiency-rate-mer
[https://perma.cc/V27F-Y3T3] (explaining MER).
136. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 15-72-102(15) (specifying waste as physical and
listing examples of economic waste); COLO. REV. STAT. § 34-60-103(11) (prescribing
various definitions of waste including physical and economic); 225 ILL. COMP. STAT.
§ 725/1 (defining waste as physical with examples of economic waste).
137. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 70-2-3; TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 85.046.
138. Cf. Flannery v. State, 85 S.W.2d 1052, 1053 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935) (arguing that
a statutory authority to limit “the production of crude petroleum oil in excess of . . .
reasonable market demand” grants the power to enact orders to that end).
139. Because OPEC and the international market now set the price of oil, states do
not generally proration anymore. See OUR MISSION, OPEC https://www.opec.org/
opec_web/en/about_us/23.htm (last visited Oct 4, 2021) (describing the purpose of
OPEC).
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4. Drilling of unnecessary wells
Subsection (C) of the Model Act includes within its definition of
waste “the drilling of unnecessary wells.”140 While the majority of the
thirty-nine states with oil and gas waste statutes do not address
unnecessary wells either in their definition of waste or of correlative
rights, ten do.141 The Eleventh Circuit explained the phenomenon:
The problem with the rule of capture is that it encourages a tract
owner to build wells near his border so as to drain not only the
reserves underlying his own tract, but also the reserves underlying a
neighboring tract. The neighboring tract owner, in order to protect
his mineral rights, must then build offsetting wells—most
advantageously right across the border from his neighbors’ wells—
and start production or risk losing his reserves. Each tract owner
then has an incentive virtually to race to drain the reservoir as
quickly as possible to capture as much oil or gas as he can. The result
is (1) economic waste in drilling unnecessary wells; (2) a
corresponding heightened risk of damage to the environment; and
(3) physical waste of the oil or gas itself because the faster
production occurs, the lower the long-term recovery will be from the
reservoir. Because of its negative effects, nearly every state has
abrogated the rule of capture legislatively with well-spacing rules,
production regulations, and/or other conservation mechanisms.142

140. MODEL OIL AND GAS CONSERVATION ACT § 1(24)(C) (INTERSTATE OIL & GAS
COMPACT COMM’N 2004).
141. States with unnecessary wells in their definition of waste: ALASKA STAT. § 31-05170(15)(J) (2021); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 353.520(2)(f) (West 2021); 58 PA. STAT.
§ 402(2)(12)(D)(ii) (West 2021) (“‘Waste’ means . . . [t]he drilling of more wells than are
reasonably required to recover, efficiently and economically, the maximum amount of oil and gas
from a pool.” (emphasis added)); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 45-9-2(15)(d) (2021); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 40-6-2(29)(c)(ii) (LexisNexis 2021); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 29, § 503(27)
(2021); WASH. REV. CODE § 78.52.010(23)(b) (2021); W. VA. CODE § 22--6--1(v) (2011).
States with unnecessary wells mentioned under correlative rights: OR. REV. STAT.
§§ 520.005(9) (2021) (“‘Protect correlative rights’ means that the action or regulation
by the board affords a reasonable opportunity to each person entitled thereto to
recover or receive the oil or gas in the tract or tracts of the person or the equivalent
thereof, without being required to drill unnecessary wells or to incur other unnecessary expense
to recover or receive such oil or gas or its equivalent.” (emphasis added)); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 45.1-361.1 (repealed Oct. 1, 2021). But cf. Righetti, supra note 73, at 704 (recognizing
that Texas “has long acknowledged the ‘virtues’ of drilling unnecessary wells” and that
the Wyoming legislature disregarded waste by “reject[ing] language that would have
permitted [consideration of] ‘the drilling of wells not reasonably necessary to effect
an economic maximum ultimate recovery of oil and gas from a pool’”).
142. Alabama v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 84 F.3d 410, 413 (11th Cir. 1996) (citations
omitted); see also Righetti, supra note 73, at 704 (“Utah defines waste more expansively
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As the excerpt notes, offset wells result in multiple injuries including
(1) economic waste, (2) heightened risk of damage to the
environment, and (3) physical waste of the resource itself from
dissipation of reservoir energy or damage to the reservoir that prevents
maximum recovery.143
With respect to economic waste, not only do the offset wells create
added expense, but they also should not have been drilled at all
because of the damage or potential damage they inflict. If neighboring
tract owners do not “offset drill” to recover what they can to prevent
drainage into the well across the border, those owners also may
become liable to royalty holders or others who own an interest in
production of those minerals.144 Overall, the result is that both
operators are forced to swallow higher production costs for the oil that
they produce. Higher production cost per barrel is “a very real cost to
the individual producer,” but society might write it off as simply “a
transfer of income between [private] producers.”145
However, excess wells have a societal impact as well. In addition to
reduced overall recovery, the proliferation of unnecessary wells
impacts the neighboring landowners by increasing their costs of
production. Moreover, society as a whole pays a greater price because
more infrastructure is required than what would be necessary to most
effectively recover the resources in a particular reservoir.146 Thus,
to include the drilling of unnecessary wells to recover the same resource, thus resulting
in an inefficient allocation of capital, increased costs of production, higher costs to the
consumer, and unnecessary consumption of surface resources.”).
143. Supra note 142 and accompanying text.
144. Texas Pac. Coal & Oil Co. v. Barker, 6 S.W.2d 1031, 1036 (Tex. 1928)
(explaining duty to drill offset or additional wells, if, considering costs and probable
profit, an ordinarily prudent person would do so). See, e.g., Barnard v. Monongahela
Natural Gas Co., 65 A. 801, 802–03 (Pa. 1907) (discussing the need for landowners to
protect their oil and gas from adjoining landowners has led to “[n]o doubt many
thousands of dollars . . . expended ‘in protecting lines’ in oil and gas territory”); Kelly
v. Ohio Oil Co., 49 N.E. 399, 401 (Ohio 1897) (finding an oil company had the right
to use its own premises to secure and appropriate oil that came to the land through
natural channels”); Texaco Inc. v. Indus. Comm’n of State of N.D., 448 N.W.2d 621,
623 n.2 (N.D. 1989) (explaining that a land owner whose drilling operations drain the
lands of adjacent landowners is not liable to the injured landowners, leaving them no
remedy but to “go and do likewise”); see also MAURICE H. MERRILL, THE LAW RELATING
TO COVENANTS IMPLIED IN OIL AND GAS LEASES 94–117 (2d ed. 1940).
145. Weaver, supra note 108, at 27 (referencing Stephen L. McDonald, Petroleum
Conservations in the United States: An Economic Analysis at 59–110 (Baltimore, MD., The
Johns Hopkins University Press for Resources for the Future, 1971)).
146. Id.
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“[p]rivate actions become socially inefficient.”147 While the short-term
effect might be a drop in the price of oil, the long-term impact is a
“price of oil above that which would prevail with unitization.”148 From
society’s viewpoint, the quantity of resource recovered is “less than
optimal,” and the price is “above the socially optimal level.”149
A “heightened risk of damage to the environment” is also a
consequence of unnecessary wells.150 In the context of oil wells, more
wells mean more chances of spills, seepage, fugitive gases, or
groundwater contamination.151 Some might argue that this risk could
also include the environmental degradation and destruction
necessitated by mining for the materials needed to construct these
unnecessary wells.152
In recent years, as more states turn to public health and
decarbonization or “green” initiatives, legislatures have been further
amending the definition of waste to place more focus on public health
and environmental concerns. An amendment to the Colorado oil and
gas statutes states that waste “[d]oes not include . . . nonproduction”
or less than maximum recovery from a reservoir if developing a well
would negatively impact public health, safety, and welfare; the
environment; or wildlife resources.153

147. Id.
148. Id. at 27.
149. Id. at 28.
150. Alabama v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 84 F.3d 410, 413 (11th Cir. 1996).
151. Cf. Nichola Groom, Special Report: Millions of Abandoned Oil Wells Are Leaking
Methane, a Climate Menace, REUTERS (June 16, 2020, 7:14 AM), https://www.
reuters.com/article/us-usa-drilling-abandoned-specialreport/special-report-millionsof-abandoned-oil-wells-are-leaking-methane-a-climate-menace-idUSKBN23N1NL
[https://perma.cc/L4EZ-TRE6] (explaining the dangers posed by the over 3.2 million
wells abandoned in the United States).
152. See, e.g., Maria Kielmas, The Types of Metals Used in the Oil & Gas Industry, CHRON,
https://smallbusiness.chron.com/types-metals-used-oil-gas-industry-55352.html
[https://perma.cc/2ETA-QGEJ] (discussing the central role played by metals such as
steel, nickel, copper, titanium, chromium, and molybdenum in drilling for gas and
oil); TRAVIS L. HUDSON ET AL., METAL MINING AND THE ENVIRONMENT 7 (Am. Geological
Inst. ed., 1999) (listing environmental consequences of metal mining such as
physically disturbing landscapes, increasing the acidity of soil, degrading surface and
groundwater quality, and releasing contaminating emissions).
153. COLO. REV. STAT. § 34-60-103(13)(b) (2021) (“[Waste d]oes not include the
nonproduction of oil or gas from a formation if necessary to protect public health,
safety, and welfare, the environment, or wildlife resources as determined by the
commission.”).
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III. FEDERAL RESPONSES TO OFFSHORE WASTE
The original Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act154 (“OCS Lands
Act”) granted the Secretary of the Interior the power to create rules
and regulations (1) “to provide for the prevention of waste and
conservation of the natural resources of the outer Continental Shelf”
and (2) for “the protection of correlative rights therein.”155 This Part
will address how the terms “prevention of waste” and “protection of
correlative rights” have been applied in the context of offshore oil and
gas development. This Part will also consider the evolving definition of
waste in the context of vented and flared gas.
A. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act
The federal government has its own definition of waste in offshore
oil and gas operations:
Waste of oil, gas, or sulphur means:
(1) The physical waste156 of oil, gas, or sulphur;
(2) The inefficient, excessive, or improper use, or the unnecessary
dissipation of reservoir energy;
(3) The locating, spacing, drilling, equipping, operating, or
producing of any oil, gas, or sulphur well(s) in a manner that causes
or tends to cause a reduction in the quantity of oil, gas, or sulphur
ultimately recoverable under prudent and proper operations or that
causes or tends to cause unnecessary or excessive surface loss or
destruction of oil or gas; or

154. 43 U.S.C. § 1334(a).
155. Id.
156. While the definition of physical waste has varied historically and
geographically, it “is commonly understood in the oil and gas industry as referring to
operational losses in oil and gas production resulting from either: surface loss or
destruction of oil and gas; or, underground loss or destruction of oil and gas.” Union
Pac. Res. Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 882 P.2d 212, 224 (Wyo. 1994) (citation omitted).
Although some states include the flaring or venting of natural gas within their
definitions of “waste,” the federal OCS Lands Act rules do not currently address flaring
or venting. In November of 2016, the Obama administration published a final Waste
Prevention Rule that regulated venting and flaring on federal lands. See Waste
Prevention, Production Subject to Royalties, and Resource Conservation, 81 Fed. Reg.
83,008 (Nov. 18, 2016). However, the Trump administration rescinded the new rule.
See Waste Prevention, Production Subject to Royalties, and Resource Conservation, 83
Fed. Reg. 49,184 (Sept. 28, 2018) (amending 43 C.F.R. § 3160 and § 3170). This
recission has since been successfully challenged in California and Wyoming. California
v. Bernhardt, 472 F. Supp. 3d 573, 632 (N.D. Cal. 2020); Wyoming v. U.S. Dep’t of
Interior, 493 F. Supp. 3d 1046, 1085–87 (D. Wyo. 2020).
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(4) The inefficient storage of oil.157

This definition differs from the Model Act,158 which has been
adopted by most states.159 Notably, the federal definition only includes
two of the items discussed above: (1) “unnecessary dissipation of
reservoir energy”—subsection (A) in the model definition; and (2)
“reduction in the quantity of resource ultimately recoverable”
subsection (C) in the model definition.160 The federal regulation does
not include the (3) “production in excess of reasonable market
demand”—subsection (D) in the model definition.161 Finally, while the
federal regulation does not include (4) “drilling of unnecessary
wells”162—in subsection (C) of the model definition—that language is
included in other portions of the OCS Lands Act. The analysis below
will address all four items.

157. 30 C.F.R. § 550.105 (providing the definition of waste for the Bureau of Ocean
Management’s operations, such as leasing, under the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS)
Lands Act); 30 C.F.R. § 250.105 (defining “[w]aste of oil, gas, or sulphur” using the
definition applicable to the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement’s
activities under the OCS Lands Act); see also 43 C.F.R. § 3160.0-5 (defining waste in the
context of onshore federal leases as “any act or failure to act by the operator that is not
sanctioned by the authorized officer as necessary for proper development and
production and which results in: (1) A reduction in the quantity or quality of oil and
gas ultimately producible from a reservoir under prudent and proper operations; or
(2) avoidable surface loss of oil or gas”). Perhaps by coincidence, it is very similar to
the definition in New York State. N.Y. ENV’T CONSERVATION LAW § 23-0101(20)
(McKinney 2021) (“‘Waste’ means a. Physical waste, as that term is generally
understood in the oil and gas industry; b. The inefficient, excessive or improper use
of, or the unnecessary dissipation of reservoir energy; c. The locating, spacing, drilling,
equipping, operating, or producing of any oil or gas well or wells in a manner which
causes or tends to cause reduction in the quantity of oil or gas ultimately recoverable
from a pool under prudent and proper operations, or which causes or tends to cause
unnecessary or excessive surface loss or destruction of oil or gas; d. The inefficient
storing of oil or gas; and e. The flaring of gas produced from an oil or condensate well
after the department has found that the use of the gas, on terms that are just and
reasonable, is, or will be economically feasible within a reasonable time.”).
158. MODEL OIL AND GAS CONSERVATION ACT § 1(24) (INTERSTATE OIL & GAS
COMPACT COMM’N 2004) (discussing the definitions of inefficient storage of oil in the
Model Act).
159. Id.; see also supra note 127 and accompanying text (explaining the definition of
inefficient storage of oil under the Model Act).
160. Id. § 1(24)(A), (C).
161. Id. § 1(24)(D).
162. Id. § 1(24)(C).
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1. Dissipation of reservoir energy
Conventional oil reservoirs trap oil and natural gas under pressure
as discussed in Section II.C.1 above.163 If an operator does not maintain
proper pressures as it develops the deposit, the natural pressure in the
reservoir that would provide propulsion for recovery is dissipated and
can be lost completely.164 The result may be leaving large quantities of
oil in the ground or worse, if the reservoir is damaged, loss of any
opportunity to recover that oil subsequently with alternative recovery
methods.165 This definition of waste is unique to the gas and fluid flows
of conventional trapped-oil reservoirs.
2. Reduction in the quantity ultimately recoverable
The definition for this portion of the federal regulation is expansive,
including consideration of numerous activities that might cause waste:
“locating, spacing, drilling, equipping, operating, or producing of
any . . . well(s).”166 Like the Model Act, the federal regulation also
provides some leeway on causation. It covers both activities that
actually “cause” as well as those that “tend[] to cause” reductions.167
Two portions of the federal regulation limit its broad reach. The
federal regulation, like the Model Act, includes the “prudent and
proper operations” language that provides some protection for
operators.168 This language permits invocation of industry standards or
government regulations as a defense. Under this relaxed standard of
reasonableness for negligence, there is little incentive for operators to
perform better if others are not.169 This wording can also work in the

163. See supra Section II.C.1.
164. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
165. See supra notes 108–11 and accompanying text.
166. 30 C.F.R. § 250.105. One of the only limitations might be application of
expressio unius est exclusio alterius canon of construction that holds exclusion of anything
not specifically listed, which could possibly narrow the scope. See Expressio unius est
exclusio alterius, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
167. MODEL OIL AND GAS CONSERVATION ACT § 1(24)(c) (Interstate Oil & Gas
Compact Comm’n 2004); 30 C.F.R. § 250.105.
168. MODEL OIL AND GAS CONSERVATION ACT § 1(24)(c) (Interstate Oil & Gas
Compact Comm’n 2004).
169. See, e.g., Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. United States, 832 F.2d 935, 944 (5th Cir.
1987) (finding defendants’ “prudent operations in accord with federal regulations and
under substantial oversight by the MMS” outweighed plaintiffs’ showing of a reduction
of resource recoverable); see also Wyoming v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 493 F. Supp.
3d 1046, 1074 (D. Wyo. 2020) (criticizing the 2016 Waste Prevention Rule as overly
broad because it designated some losses of natural gas as “avoidable,” and therefore
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other direction: one operator’s compromise might create an industry
standard below what other prudent operators would recommend.170
Finally, this section allows recovery for surface loss or destruction of oil
or gas but only if “unnecessary” or “excessive,” which raises the burden
of proof required.171
If reducing the quantity ultimately recoverable represents waste,
then avoiding it by maximizing recovery represents the other side of
the ameliorative waste coin.172 As discussed in Section II.C.2 above,
cooperative development or unitization are the vehicles that best wed
the protection of correlative rights with achieving the most efficient
and economic recovery of a resource.173 The federal rules explicitly
authorize mandates for “joint development and unitization” of OCS
leases as a way to conserve resources, protect correlative rights,
enhance federal royalty interests, and prevent waste.174
3. Production in excess of reasonable market demand
It is logical that the federal definition might choose not to include
“production . . . in excess of reasonable market demand”175 from
subsection (D) of the Model Act. Though not included in many of the
state statutes, this provision primarily works to protect operators from
dramatic price variations.176 Thus, it addresses economic protections
for mostly private harms, with which the government need not
interfere.
subject to royalties, “without determining whether a reasonable and prudent operator
would, given the circumstances, capture and market the gas.”). See generally infra
Section III.D (addressing ways in which the federal government can use comparable
regulations and unitization-like approaches to maximize development of U.S. offshore
wind resources).
170. See infra Section III.D.2.
171. See MODEL OIL AND GAS CONSERVATION ACT § 1(24)(A) (Interstate Oil & Gas
Compact Comm’n 2004); 30 C.F.R. § 250.105.
172. See, e.g., Breton Energy, L.L.C. v. Mariner Energy Res., Inc., 764 F.3d 394, 396–
97 (5th Cir. 2014) (reversing and remanding the district court’s grant of a motion to
dismiss under FRCP 12(b)(6)–therefore rejecting plaintiff’s claim for waste under
several theories, including reduction of the quantity of recoverable oil and gas when
one company’s well may have penetrated and drained plaintiff’s oil and gas rights).
173. See supra Section II.C.2.
174. 30 C.F.R. § 250.1300 (“[T]he purpose of joint development and unitization”
of OCS leases is “(a) [c]onserv[ing] natural resources; (b) [p]revent[ing] waste;
and/or (c) [p]rotect[ing] correlative rights, including Federal royalty interests.”).
175. MODEL OIL AND GAS CONSERVATION ACT § 1(24)(D) (Interstate Oil & Gas
Compact Comm’n 2004).
176. See supra notes 134–35 and accompanying text.
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4. Drilling of unnecessary wells
There are numerous public benefits from discouraging the use of
duplicative infrastructure that does not increase overall recovery of a
resource. While the federal rule definition of waste does not explicitly
include protections against “drilling of unnecessary wells,” this
language may not be necessary; the federal government already has the
authority, which it uses, to encourage or force lessees to enter into
cooperation or unitization agreements.177 Such agreements require
operators who have acquired separate leases to collaborate holistically.
The result is both minimizing costs and maximizing the total resource
recovery.178 This goal protects the correlative co-owners of the resource
as well as society’s interest in the optimal development of the nation’s
resources.
Cases interpreting the federal rule have held that omission of
explicit language in the rule to recover for the cost of additional wells
means that the federal regime does not recognize this form of waste.
For example, in Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. United States,179 the federal
government used its discretion to refuse a unitization agreement that
would have included the Louisiana with a private federal lessee in an

177. Supra Section II.C.2 (discussing the federal government’s authority to act). 30
C.F.R. § 250 subpart M contains regulations that specifically address BSEE’s regulation
of offshore unitization. See also, Alabama v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 84 F.3d 410, 418
(11th Cir. 1996) (holding that, once the Department of the Interior (DOI) has
negotiated in good faith to reach a cooperative development agreement with coastal
states and federal private leases and no agreement is reached, the DOI may proceed
unilaterally to authorize a plan, which the court noted is “closely akin to section
8(g)(3), which gives the DOI the authority to enter into ‘unitization or other royalty
sharing agreement[s]’ with states regarding reservoirs straddling the federal/state
border”); New OCS Unitization Rules—Authority of the Sec’y to Segregate Partially
Unitized Offshore Leases, 1980 I.D. LEXIS 102 (M36927); Sun Oil Co., 93 Interior
Dec. 95, 113 (IBLA 1986); Noble Energy, Inc. v. Salazar, 691 F. Supp. 2d 14, 25 (D.D.C.
2010) (holding that the federal government may exclude leases from a unitization
agreement and IBLA’s procedures for reaching its own conclusion as to the propriety
of excluding the lessees’ leases from their respective units were unbiased and based on
an evidentiary record); Aera Energy LLC v. Salazar, 691 F. Supp. 2d 25, 36–37 (D.D.C.
2010) (denying summary judgment using the same reasoning as Noble Energy).
178. Howard R. Williams, Conservation of Oil and Gas, 65 HARV. L. REV. 1155, 1156
(1952) (describing how oil and gas conservation is coterminous with “attaining
maximum production from known fields by more efficient utilization of reservoir
energy”).
179. 832 F.2d 935 (5th Cir. 1987).
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oil and gas reservoir under both federal and state submerged lands.180
Louisiana argued that it was entitled to additional royalties from the
private lessee under a theory of excessive drainage away from
Louisiana’s wells and into the lessee’s. Louisiana reasoned, under a
theory of waste, that Louisiana and its lessee would have to drill
unnecessary wells unless there was an agreement.181 The court
disagreed, pointing explicitly to the fact that the federal regulation did
not include any language about the drilling of unnecessary wells:
The Secretary has defined “correlative rights” as the right of adjacent
lessees to be afforded an equal opportunity to explore for, develop,
and produce hydrocarbons without waste. 30 C.F.R. § 250.2(i).
“Waste” is defined as the physical waste of hydrocarbons, the
dissipation of reservoir energy, and the reduction of the amount of
ultimately recoverable hydrocarbons. 30 C.F.R. § 250.2(qq). Notably,
economic losses inherent in the cost of drilling wells to exploit a common pool
are excluded from this definition.182
180. Id. at 942. Shortly after certiorari was denied, Congress amended the OCS
Lands Act to require “cooperative development,” effectively unitization, in similar
situations in the future. 43 U.S.C. § 1334(j) (“Cooperative development of common
hydrocarbon-bearing areas (1) Findings (A) The Congress of the United States finds
that the unrestrained competitive production of hydrocarbons from a common
hydrocarbon-bearing geological area underlying the Federal and State boundary may
result in a number of harmful national effects, including—(i) the drilling of
unnecessary wells, the installation of unnecessary facilities and other imprudent
operating practices that result in economic waste, environmental damage, and damage
to life and property; (ii) the physical waste of hydrocarbons and an unnecessary
reduction in the amounts of hydrocarbons that can be produced from certain
hydrocarbon-bearing areas; and (iii) the loss of correlative rights which can result in
the reduced value of national hydrocarbon resources and disorders in the leasing of
Federal and State resources. (2) Prevention of harmful effects The Secretary shall
prevent, through the cooperative development of an area, the harmful effects of
unrestrained competitive production of hydrocarbons from a common hydrocarbonbearing area underlying the Federal and State boundary.” (footnote omitted)).
181. Guste, 832 F.2d at 937. The court granted summary judgment for the defendant
holding on this issue that the mandatory division of revenues under the amendments
to § 8(g) of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act were intended to fully compensate
the state government for drainage losses, and thus, the Secretary of the Interior had
no duty under § 8(g) to enter into a unitization or royalty sharing agreement to
compensate states for drainage losses. Id. at 1312.
182. Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. United States, 656 F. Supp. 1310, 1320 (W.D. La.
1986), aff’d, 832 F.2d 935 (5th Cir. 1987 (emphasis added). This case was effectively
reversed by statute shortly thereafter by inclusion of the specific remedy requested by
Louisiana in a “Miscellaneous” provision added to the OCS Land Act in 1989. Oil
Pollution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-380, § 6004, 104 Stat. 484 (1990) (“(b)
Exception for West Delta Field.—Section 5(j) of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands
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Just a year after Guste, however, a federal district court in a different
district of Louisiana addressed unnecessary wells in Clark Oil Producing
Co. v. Hodel.183 Plaintiff, Clark Oil challenged the Secretary of the
Interior’s authority to unitize its leases, but the court granted summary
judgment on this issue in favor of the Secretary of the Interior, holding
the unitization order was proper.184 Specifically, the court noted that it
was reasonable for government officials to conclude that preventing
the drilling of unnecessary wells that “would not have increased overall
production” aided “conservation,” explaining:
An order requiring unitization to prevent the drilling of an
unnecessary well furthers the interest of conservation because well
drilling and completion operations are a potential source of
pollution. In addition, the drilling of an unnecessary well entails the
diversion of scarce drilling equipment and expert manpower from
more productive uses. Potentially adverse effects of separate
operations can be avoided only by careful scrutiny of each drilling
application.185

Clark Oil’s leases were granted in 1971, and the USGS Conservation
Manager ordered unitization between Clark Oil and Shell Oil in
1975.186 Clark Oil challenged this order on a number of grounds
Act, as added by this section, shall not be applicable with respect to Blocks 17 and 18
of the West Delta Field offshore Louisiana. (c) Authorization of Appropriations.—
There are hereby authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary to
provide compensation, including interest, to the State of Louisiana and its lessees, for
net drainage of oil and gas resources as determined in the Third Party Factfinder
Louisiana Boundary Study dated March 21, 1989. For purposes of this section, such
lessees shall include those persons with an ownership interest in State of Louisiana
leases SL10087, SL10088 or SL10187, or ownership interests in the production or
proceeds therefrom, as established by assignment, contract or otherwise. Interest shall
be computed for the period March 21, 1989 until the date of payment.”). However,
the statute does not change the court’s analysis and the tension between the Guste and
Clark cases concerning omission of specific language.
183. 667 F. Supp. 281 (E.D. La. 1987).
184. Id. at 283, 290. Clark Oil challenged the Secretary of Interior’s authority to
unitize its leases. However, the court held not only that the authority was proper but
also that it was reasonable for the IBLA to conclude that the prevention of the drilling
of unnecessary wells was “in the interest of conservation” as contemplated by 43 U.S.C.
§ 1334 and 30 C.F.R. § 250.50. Id.
185. Id. at 285 (citations omitted) (“The Director [of the USGS] found that Shell
intended to drill additional wells in order to compete with Sun’s production, and that
permission to do so had been denied informally by USGS. ‘[A] sufficient number of
wells already had been drilled to drain the reservoir’ and additional wells would have
been unnecessary because they would not have increased overall production.”).
186. Id. at 283.
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primarily focused on the meaning of “conservation.”187 Although the
OCS Lands Act authorized consideration of correlative rights in
addition to conservation, the federal regulation in effect at the time of
Clark Oil’s unitization order only authorized compulsory unitization
“in the interest of conservation.”188 Finding against Clark Oil, the court
followed the rule of deference to an agency’s reasonable interpretation
of a statute made by the agency charged with its administration and
stated:
It is clear that the Department of the Interior had interpreted the
term in the interest of conservation in a broad sense to encompass
the protection of the environment long before the 1975 order of
unitization. Additionally there existed case law interpreting the
phrase “in the interest of conservation” to encompass all the natural
resources of the outer continental shelf, not only the mineral
resources. As stated in Union Oil, “[t]he Secretary is responsible for
conserving marine life, recreational potential, and aesthetic values,
as well as the resources of gas and oil.”189

Despite these conflicting opinions within Louisiana, only the Guste
case was appealed. On appeal, Louisiana abandoned the “unnecessary
wells” claim that would not be supported by the express definition of
waste in the Code of Federal Regulations.190 Instead, Louisiana focused
on the defendants’ “well spacing and production practices,” which
plaintiff-appellants argued “tend to cause reduction in the quantity of
gas ultimately recoverable.”191 The court found evidence submitted to
support this conclusion was outweighed by the defendants’ “prudent
187. Id. at 288–89 (challenging the Conservation Manager’s order on four grounds:
(1) it did not contain the required evidence that unitization was necessary for
conservation; (2) since unitization did not increase ultimate gas recovery, the order of
unitization is invalid as “conservation” in this context refers exclusively to conserving
the greatest ultimate recovery of oil and gas; (3) “economic waste” should not be a
factor in determining whether unitization is proper; and (4) the claim that unitization
serves conservation by reducing environmental risks is legally defective and
evidentially deficient).
188. Id. at 289 (citing 30 C.F.R. § 250.50 (1975)).
189. Id. at 289–90 (fifth alteration in original) (citations omitted) (citing Union Oil
Co. Cal. v. Morton, 512 F.2d 743, 749 (9th Cir. 1975)). An applicant must show that its
proposal will “not unreasonably interfere with other uses of the OCS,” 30 C.F.R.
§ 585.606(a)(3) (2016), nor “cause undue harm or damage to natural resources; life
(including human and wildlife); property; the marine, coastal, or human
environment; or sites, structures, or objects of historical or archaeological
significance.” § 585.606(a)(4).
190. Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. United States, 832 F.2d 935, 944 (5th Cir. 1987).
191. Id.
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operations in accord with federal regulations and under substantial
oversight by the MMS.”192
In addition to these comparisons between the federal rule and the
sections of the Model Act, there are at least two significant takeaways
from this analysis of the federal law of waste and correlative rights.
First, the language in the OCS Lands Act envisions protections for all
OCS resources, even if the federal regulations addressing waste in the
oil and gas context do not include similar language. For example, the
OCS Lands Act allows the Secretary of the Interior “to provide for the
“prevention of waste and conservation of the natural resources of the
outer Continental Shelf, and the protection of correlative rights
therein.”193 Notably, the OCS Lands Act says, “protection of correlative
rights therein,” specifically referencing the outer Continental Shelf and
not limiting protection to mineral rights alone.194
The Clark Oil court identified some other items that warrant
protection under the OCS Lands Act: limiting “a potential source of
pollution,” minimizing “disturb[ance of] marine life,” and preventing
“diversion of scarce drilling equipment and expert manpower from
more productive uses.”195 The Clark Oil court also refused to entertain
how many unnecessary wells were needed, saying that preventing even
one unnecessary well was sufficient.196
Second, the tension between the Guste case in the Eastern District of
Louisiana, which held that the failure of the federal definition of waste
to explicitly mention unnecessary wells meant there was no protection
for such additional costs, and the Clark Oil case’s recognition of

192. Id.
193. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 694 (codified
as 43 U.S.C. § 1334(a)).
194. Id. (emphasis added).
195. Clark Oil Producing Co. v. Hodel, 667 F. Supp. 281, 285–86 (E.D. La. 1987)
(“An order requiring unitization to prevent the drilling of an unnecessary well furthers
the interest of conservation because well drilling and completion operations disturb
marine life and are a potential source of pollution. Potentially adverse cumulative
effects of separate operations on natural resources can be reduced or eliminated by
minimizing the total number of wells drilled on different leases.”).
196. Id. at 286 (“It can be argued that the prevention of the drilling of one
additional well does not eliminate a risk to the resources of the OCS so as to constitute
a significant conservation purpose. This argument cannot be accepted. There would
be no merit to a dispute as to how many unnecessary wells constitute too many. Suffice
it to say that the prevention of drilling of one unnecessary well avoids an unnecessary
risk to natural resources and constitutes conservation of such resources so as to justify
unitization.”).
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unnecessary wells as waste sufficient to justify unitization, shows the
broad range of discretion available to those interpreting the
regulations.197 The current federal regulations do not include “drilling
of unnecessary wells” within the definition of waste, and these cases
illustrate why language explicitly requiring the avoidance of
unnecessary wells or other infrastructure needs to be included to
prevent varying interpretations that do not consider this factor.198 Such
language would provide real protection for this problem in all
circumstances.
B. 2016 Waste Prevention Rules Proposed by Bureau of Land Management
A discussion of waste in the context of federal oil and gas
development would not be complete without mention of the 2016
Waste Prevention Rules proposed by the Bureau of Land Management
(BLM) to address the loss of natural gas through venting, flaring, and
leaking.199 The Mineral Leasing Act of 1920200 (“MLA”) requires the
BLM to ensure that lessees “use all reasonable precautions to
prevent waste of oil or gas developed in the land.”201 The 2016 rules
represented the first amendment in thirty years and were intended to
update the regulations to reflect new technologies that better capture
natural gas and to address the loss of royalties to the federal
government—and thus to the American people—of an estimated
three to fourteen million dollars per year.202
The 2016 Waste Prevention Rules were immediately challenged in
court and, after a number of appeals, were vacated by a federal district

197. See Guste, 832 F.2d at 944; Clark Oil, 667 F. Supp. at 290.
198. See Guste, 832 F.2d at 944; Clark Oil, 667 F. Supp. at 290.
199. See 43 C.F.R. 3179.6-.10 (2017).
200. Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, Pub. L. No. 66-146, 41 Stat. 437.
201. 30 U.S.C. § 225.
202. 81 Fed. Reg. 83,014 (Nov. 18, 2016) (assuming a three percent discount rate
to annualize capital costs). The BLM estimated the benefits of the rule would
significantly outweigh the costs. Id. While the costs were estimated at $110-$275 million
per year (at a three percent discount rate), the benefits, in the form of cost savings to
the industry, were estimated at $209-$403 million per year (modelling the social cost
of methane with a three percent discount rate). Id. at 83,068–69. Natural gas
production was estimated to increase from nine to forty-one billion cubic feet per year,
but crude oil production is expected to decline by up to 3.2 million barrels per year.
Id. at 83,014. These minimal changes signify that the rule should not adversely affect
the price or supply of energy markets. Id.
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court in Wyoming.203 The court cited discussion of the social cost of
methane, and the inclusion of those benefits in the cost-benefit
analysis, as evidence that the BLM was attempting to regulate air
quality, rather than waste, and that regulation was beyond the BLM’s
statutory authority under the Mineral Leasing Act and a violation of
states’ authority under the Clean Air Act.204
Furthermore, the court in Wyoming noted that its decision might be
different if this were a “new policy created on a blank slate,” evoking
detrimental reliance and industry standards of reasonableness for a
prudent operator to support its decision to vacate the key provisions of
the rule.205
IV. WIND WAKES AND WASTE
Wind turbines create downwind turbulence much like a boat making
waves in the water as it moves.206 Wind wakes result in two distinct forms
203. Wyoming v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 493 F. Supp. 3d 1046, 1074, 1087 (D.
Wyo. 2020) (criticizing the 2016 Waste Prevention Rule as overly broad because it
designated some losses of natural gas as “avoidable,” and therefore subject to royalties,
“without determining whether a reasonable and prudent operator would, given the
circumstances, capture and market the gas”).
204. Id. at 1068–70.
205. Id. at 1084 (quoting Fed. Commc’n Comm’n v. Fox Television Stations, Inc.,
556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009) (plurality opinion), vacated, 613 F.3d 317 (2nd Cir. 2010))
(“When an agency’s new policy ‘rests upon factual findings that contradict those which
underlay its prior policy[,] or when its prior policy has engendered serious reliance
interests that must be taken into account,’ the agency must ‘provide a more detailed
justification than what would suffice for a new policy created on a blank slate.’”
(alteration in original)); id. at 1072 (“The MLA incorporates the ‘prudent operator’
standard through the provisions requiring lessees to exercise ‘reasonable diligence, skill,
and care’ in the operation of the lease and subjecting Federal leases to the condition
that lessees will use ‘all reasonable precautions to prevent waste of oil or gas developed
in the land.’ . . . The exercise of ‘reasonable diligence’ and employment of ‘reasonable
precautions’ under the MLA do not require an operator to render its operations
uneconomical by capturing and marketing uneconomic gas.” (citation omitted)).
206. J.K. Lundquist et al., Costs and Consequences of Wind Turbine Wake Effects Arising
from Uncoordinated Wind Energy Development, 4 NATURE ENERGY 26, 26 (2019); Kimberly
E. Diamond & Ellen J. Crivella, Wind Turbine Wakes, Wake Effect Impacts, and Wind Leases:
Using Solar Access Laws as the Model for Capitalizing on Wind Rights During the Evolution of
Wind Policy Standards, 22 DUKE ENV’T L. & POL’Y F. 195, 195 (2011); see TROY A. RULE,
SOLAR, WIND AND LAND: CONFLICTS IN RENEWABLE ENERGY DEVELOPMENT 50 (2014)
[hereinafter RULE, CONFLICTS] (explaining how downward wake impacts can create a
claim for nuisance); see also Troy Rule, A Downwind View of the Cathedral: Using Rule Four
to Allocate Wind Rights, 46 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 208–09 (2009) [hereinafter Rule, Using
Rule Four] (explaining that downwind wake effects can stretch more than half a mile).
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of loss: (a) equipment damage and (b) energy loss. Sections A and B
of this Part will address these forms of loss. Next, Section C explains
how U.S. onshore wind developers have resorted to a “moat mentality”
to protect themselves against these forms of loss. Finally, Section D will
apply the waste analysis from the previous sections of this Article to
wind development, concluding with some recommendations for
avoiding waste in U.S. offshore development.
A. Equipment Damage
If wind turbines are spaced too closely—between three and ten rotor
diameters (RD)—the turbulence behind the upwind turbine can cause
turbine blade fatigue.”207 In addition, the uneven load on one side or
another leads to lower efficiencies, diminished output, less costeffective operation, and a shorter service life for the gears and other
overall components of the turbine.208 This increases the operation and
maintenance costs, decreases the life of the turbine, and can create
safety concerns.209

207. K.K. DuVivier & Brendan Mooney, Moat Mentality: Onshore and Offshore
Approaches to Wind Waking, 1 NOTRE DAME J. EMERGING TECH. 1, 12–15 (2020). It should
be noted that wind patterns vary around the country and the world. At some locations,
the wind rose, or graphic measurement of the direction of wind volume and speed
over time, shows the wind blowing in a widely varying or bimodal pattern. A bimodal
wind rose suggests that one wind plant might be upwind for part of the time, waking a
downwind plant. But when the wind direction changes, that wind plant may then
become the downwind plant, which is now waked by the plant that it previously
impacted. See Aaron Walters, A Fast Way to Find Fatigue Damage on Wind Turbines from
Partial Waking, https://www.et.byu.edu/~vps/ME505/AAEM/V4-10.pdf [https://
perma.cc/GLD2-EN3W] (explaining a study on wind conditions that can increase
turbine’s lifespan and reduce future maintenance costs); see also Ben DuBose, New
Rotor Blade Inspection Methods for Offshore Wind Turbines, MATERIALS PERFORMANCE (May
4, 2020, 12:58 PM), https://www.materialsperformance.com/articles/coatinglinings/2018/02/new-rotor-blade-inspection-methods-for-offshore-wind-turbines
[https://perma.cc/68R4-KEZ7] (exploring the use of drone and mobile
thermography technology to potentially increase the lifespan of wind turbines).
208. Walters, supra note 207, at 1; see also Inspecting Rotor Blades with Thermography
and Acoustic Monitoring, FRAUNHOFER-GESELLSCHAFT (Dec. 1, 2017), https://
www.fraunhofer.de/en/press/research-news/2017/december/inspecting-rotorblades-with-thermography-and-acoustic-monitoring.html [https://perma.cc/R8XDR36G] (explaining the increased complexities with maintaining offshore wind
turbines due to harsh weather conditions that prevent regular maintenance).
209. Interview with Steve Drouilhet, Founder & CEO, Sustainable Power Systems,
Boulder, Colorado (Apr. 29, 2016) (reporting that fatigue after 6 months of operation
can result in blades detaching from the nacelle hub or other failures).
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Early U.S. wind farm developers did not fully appreciate turbine
wake dynamics.210 For example, a project started in 1989 at the San
Gorgonio Pass in Southern California spaced almost 1,000 turbines in
forty-one closely spaced rows.211 This tight spacing caused the turbines
to experience premature fatigue, frequent failures, and significant
damage to the components.212 With new insights, developers now
model waking at the project layout stage.213 If this modeling suggests
that a turbine is located too closely to another, this may compromise
the warranty from the turbine manufacturer.214
Wind turbines continue to increase in capacity and size.215 Currently,
the largest offshore wind turbine in the world is fourteen megawatt
with an RD of twenty-two meters.216 Spacing two of these turbines at
five RD to avoid damaging each other would mean that they should be
over one kilometer, or approaching three-quarters of a mile, apart.217
210. DuVivier & Mooney, supra note 207, at 22; see id. at 2 n.11 (explaining the
terminology “wind farm” or “farm” when used in context, is interchangeable with
“wind plant” or “wind power project”).
211. Neil D. Kelley, Nat’l Wind Tech. Ctr., Boundary Layer Turbulence and
Turbine Interactions with a Historical Perspective at AMS Short Course, at 18–19 (Aug.
1, 2010); see also Neil D. Kelley et al., Using Wavelet Analysis to Assess Turbulence-Rotor
Interactions, 3 WIND ENERGY 121, 129–34 (2000) (expressing the importance of
adequate wind flow to maintain reduced fatigue damage in turbines).
212. Kelly et al., supra note 211, at 133.
213. DuVivier & Mooney, supra note 207, at 11.
214. See, e.g., Waveney Dist. Council v. Next Generation Ltd. [2003] P.A.D. 36, 344,
352 [5.4] (Eng.) (“Correspondence from the turbine supplier (Enron Wind, now GE
Wind Energy) indicates that an absolute minimum spacing of 300m is required
between turbines in order to validate warranty conditions.”).
215. See John Parnell, Siemens Gamesa Launches 14MW Offshore Wind Turbine, World’s
Largest, GREENTECH MEDIA (May 19, 2020), https://www.greentechmedia.com/
articles/read/siemens-gamesa-takes-worlds-largest-turbine-title [https://perma.cc/
656V-U5JM] (explaining that turbines keep getting bigger, but financial limitations
may ultimately halt the development of developing even larger turbines).
216. Id. The turbine blades and hub form the rotor portion of a wind turbine and
are attached to the nacelle, which contains the electricity generation equipment, on
the tower. Rotor diameters are a standard measurement in wind development and are
roughly equivalent to the length of two turbine blades. At time of publication, the GE
Haliade-X is the largest commercially available wind turbine in the world. However,
the upcoming Siemens Gamesa 14-222 DD model, at fourteen megawatt and an
RD of 222 meters, is slightly larger. Id.
217. See Dillon Clayton, Wind Turbine Spacing: How Far Apart Should they Be?, ENERGY
FOLLOWER (July 20, 2021), https://energyfollower.com/wind-turbine-spacing
[https://perma.cc/2L36-LCRV] (explaining that wind turbines should be spaced
apart seven times the distance of their rotor diameter). The Siemens Gamesa 14-222
DD has an RD of 222 meters (or equivalent to about 728 feet per RD), then there
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This spacing is necessary to avoid premature fatigue and equipment
damage to the turbines.
B. Energy Loss
The goal of a wind farm is to extract energy from wind to generate
electricity. The loss of energy when an upwind farm diminishes the
flow to downwind farms can be an even more costly impact of wakes
in comparison to equipment damage.218 Onshore wind energy
development in the United States has been a cutthroat business—
highly competitive and secretive.219 Developers have not openly shared
specifics about upwind projects cannibalizing downwind productivity,
but public data about electricity production along with atmospheric
and economic modeling provided the basis for a 2018 Nature Energy
article about the scope of wake impacts.220 The article studied three
wind farms in West Texas—one predominantly upwind (“Loraine”),
one predominantly downwind (“Roscoe”), and one “control”
(“Champion”).221 Because the upwind farm was built after both the
downwind and control, it was possible to measure the impact of the
energy loss on the downwind farm resulting from the construction of
the upwind farm.222 The upwind farm’s wakes caused significant
decreases in the amount of electricity generated by the downwind farm
resulting in a loss of revenue of up to $730,000 in lost sales and $2
million in lost production tax credits annually.223 In addition, the value
of the fossil-fuel generated power that the wind farm displaced over

would still be a turbulence impact at five RDs or 3640 feet. William Mathis, Battle Over
World’s Biggest Turbine Is Heating Up, BLOOMBERG NEWS (May 19, 2020),
https://financialpost.com/pmn/business-pmn/battle-over-worlds-biggest-windturbine-is-heating-up [https://perma.cc/7U2X-QADL].
218. K.K. DuVivier, Wind Power Growing Pains, 21 CHAPMAN NEXUS J.L. & POL’Y 1, 9
(2016); see also DuVivier & Mooney, supra note 207, at 10–11 (explaining the losses
from downwind wake loss “can be in the millions of dollars or more annually”).
219. DuVivier, supra note 218, at 9; see also DuVivier & Mooney, supra note 207, at
18–20 (explaining that because developers wish to prioritize profits, they will often not
accurately space turbines causing energy and money loss to neighboring plants).
220. See Lundquist et al., supra note 206, at 26 (analyzing the impact of the 2008–
2009 construction of the Loraine wind project on the existing Roscoe project in
Texas).
221. Id.
222. Id. at 31.
223. Id. at 28.
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the study period represented an additional $4.1 million based on a
social cost of carbon of $37 per ton.224
Most onshore U.S. wind farms appear to be in locations where they
are, or could be, vulnerable to wakes.225 Additionally, the scientific
community continues to research the extent of energy loss impacts
offshore.226 Early studies off the coast of Denmark show wake trails that
propagate for 20 kilometers (or about 12.5 miles) before near-neutral
conditions are reached.227 While some have used a ten RD rule of
thumb for full wake protection, other studies have tracked wakes for
more than seventeen kilometers.228 In addition, some models have
even shown a reduction of ten percent between wind farms sixty
kilometers (thirty-five miles) away.229
224. Id.
225. See K.K. DuVivier & Mooney, supra note 207, at 26 n.158 (explaining a review
of the 2019 U.S. Wind turbine database website revealed that almost twenty-two
percent of U.S. onshore wind farms are within five RD of a turbine in an adjacent farm,
and almost thirty-eight percent are within ten RD).
226. See, e.g., Pedro A. Jiménez et al., Mesoscale Modeling of Offshore Wind Turbine
Wakes at the Wind Farm Resolving Scale: AA Composite-Based Analysis with the Weather
Research and Forecasting Model Over Horns Rev, 18 WIND ENERGY 559, 559 (2015) (using
mesoscale modeling to study offshore wind turbine wakes); see also Clara M. St. Martin
et al., Wind Turbine Power Production and Annual Energy Production Depend on Atmospheric
Stability and Turbulence, 1 WIND ENERGY SCI. 221, 221 (2016) (studying power curves and
energy production on a wind turbine); Nicolai Gayle Nygaard & Sidse Damgaard
Hansen, Wake Effects Between Two Neighbouring Wind Farms, 753 J.PHYSICS: CONF. SERIES
1, 9–10 (2016) (comparing two offshore wind farms to better understand “wind farm
clusters”); Nicolai Gayle Nygaard, Wakes in Very Large Wind Farms and the Effect of
Neighbouring Wind Farms, 524 J. PHYSICS: CONF. SERIES 1, 1–2 (2014) (studying three
wind farms to analyze wakes and energy loss).
227. Merete Bruun Christiansen & Charlotte B. Hasager, Wake Effects of Large
Offshore Wind Farms Identified from Satellite SAR, 98 REMOTE SENSING ENV’T 251, 252, 266
(2005); see Charlotte B. Hasager et al., Using Satellite SAR to Characterize the Wind Flow
around Offshore Wind Farms, 8 ENERGIES 5413, 5413 (2015) (analyzing Synthetic
Aperture Radar at various wind farm clusters and determining Denmark’s Horns Rev
two as being the strongest)); see also Nygaard supra note 226, at 8–10 (explaining
research about the impact of the Rødsand II wind project on the efficiency of the
Nysted project in the North Sea, which showed turbine efficiency dropped by twentyone percent).
228. Nicolai Gayle Nygaard & Alexander Christian Newcombe, Wake Behind an
Offshore Wind Farm Observed with Dual-Doppler Radars, 1037 J. PHYSICS: CONF. SERIES 1, 4
(2018).
229. Anna C. Fitch et al., Mesoscale Influences of Wind Farms Throughout a Diurnal Cycle,
141 MONTHLY WEATHER REV. 2173, 2182 (2013). Wakes from wind plants over the sea
are expected to extend further downwind than those over land, especially under a
more stable flow, which inhibits thermally produced turbulence. Martin Dörenkämper
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C. Current Solution to Wind Waste: Moats
U.S. wind law appears to follow the same rule of capture that prevails
in oil and gas development.230 Yet, in contrast to oil and gas, the
property status of wind rights in the United States is uncertain and has
been debated for over a century.231 In most other countries in the
et al., On the Offshore Advection of Boundary-Layer Structures and the Influence on Offshore
Wind Conditions, 155 BOUNDARY LAYER METEOROLOGY 459, 460 (2015); see also Mark A.
Harral et al., The Wake Effect: Impacting Turbine Siting Agreements, N. AM. CLEAN ENERGY
(Jan. 20, 2013), https://web.archive.org/web/20210115205437/http://www.naclean
energy.com/articles/15348/the-wake-effect-impacting-turbine-siting-agreements
(citing Brian D. Hirth & John L. Schroeder, Documenting Wind Speed and Power Deficits
Behind a Utility-Scale Wind Turbine, 52 J. APPLIED METEOROLOGY & CLIMATOLOGY 39
(2013)).
230. See, e.g., Romero v. Bernell, 603 F. Supp. 2d 1333, 1335 (D.N.M. 2009) (stating
that wind should be treated “like water or wild animals which traverse the surface and
which do not belong to the fee owner until reduced to possession”); see also Contra
Costa Water Dist. v. Vaquero Farms, Inc., 68 Cal. Rptr. 2d 272, 278 (Ct. App. 1997)
(“[T]he right to generate electricity from windmills harnessing the wind, and the right
to sell the power so generated, is no different, either in law or common sense, from
the right to pump and sell subsurface oil, or subsurface natural gas by means of wells
and pumps.”); Terry E. Hogwood, Against the Wind, 26 OIL, GAS & ENERGY RES. L. SEC.
REP. 6, 6–7 (State Bar of Tex. 2001); Ernest Smith, Wind Energy: Siting Controversies and
Rights in Wind, 1 ENV’T & ENERGY L. & POL’Y J. 281, 301 (2007) (citing Hogwood to say
wind ownership may be comparable to the “capture” theory used for wild animals or
the law of percolating water).
231. See, e.g., Kimberly E. Diamond, Wake Effects, Wind Rights, and Wind Turbines: Why
Science, Constitutional Rights, and Public Policy Issues Play a Crucial Role, 40 WM. & MARY
ENV’T L. & POL’Y REV. 813, 822 (2016); Yael Lifshitz, Rethinking Original Ownership, 66
U. TORONTO L.J. 513, 514 (2016); Yael Lifshitz, Note, Winds of Change: Drawing on Water
Law Doctrines to Establish Wind Law, 23 N.Y.U. ENV’T L.J. 434, 437 (2015); RULE,
CONFLICTS, supra note 206, at 50; Diamond & Crivella, supra note 206, at 204; 204; K.K.
DuVivier, Sins of the Father, 1 TEX. A&M J. REAL PROP. L. 391, 412 (2014) [hereinafter
DuVivier, Sins]; Ernest E. Smith & Becky Diffen, Winds of Change: The Creation of Wind
Law, 5 TEX. J. OIL GAS & ENERGY L. 165, 166 (2009–2010); Troy Rule, Sharing the Wind,
27 ENV’T F. 30 (2010); Yael Lifshitz-Goldberg, Comment, Gone with the Wind? The
Potential Tragedy of the Common Wind, 28 UCLA J. ENV’T L. & POL’Y 435, 436 (2010); K.K.
DuVivier, Animal, Vegetable, Mineral—Wind? The Severed Wind Power Rights Conundrum,
49 WASHBURN L.J. 69, 69 (2009) [hereinafter DuVivier, Wind Power Rights]; K.K.
DuVivier & Roderick E. Wetsel, Jousting at Windmills: When Wind Power Development
Collides with Oil, Gas, and Mineral Development, 55 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 9-1, 9-4
(2009); Lisa Chavarria, The Severance of Wind Rights in Texas, STAHL, BERNAL & DAVIES
L.L.P. 1, 1, https://www.sbaustinlaw.com/library-papers/Chavarria-The_Severance
_of_Wind_Rights%20(Final).pdf [https://perma.cc/7C86-MQ8A]; Lisa Chavarria,
Wind Power Prospective: Issues, 68 TEX. B.J. 832, 835 (2005) (stating that Chavarria does
not support or oppose the practice of severance but recognizes that it is common
among Texas landowners); Hogwood, supra 230; Smith, supra 230, at 301 (“Wind does

50

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:1

world, natural resources—including minerals and wind—are owned by
the state.232 In the United States, wind sometimes appears to be
privately owned when associated with private lands, but the nature of
that ownership is unclear.233 In the absence of a legal structure that
provides compensation for losses or incentives for inter-developer
cooperation, onshore wind farm developers in the United States have
modeled their turbine layouts to maximize production from the
properties they control regardless of the impact upon neighboring
projects.234
In addition, to counter the aggression of neighboring developers
under this catch-as-catch can, each-for-themselves legal structure,
onshore wind developers have resorted to creating moats or buffer
zones around many of their projects as a protective measure for
themselves.235 The United Kingdom, which is the world leader in
offshore wind development, has codified these defensive moats in its

not share the physical characteristics of solid minerals or of water. It can hardly be
deemed part of the fee simple or owned ‘in place’ by a landowner.”). Smith also cites
Hogwood to say wind ownership may be comparable to the “capture” theory used for
wild animals or the law of percolating water and Contra Costa for noting that states
may alternatively “look to oil and gas law for an analogy.” Id. at 300–01; Joseph O.
Wilson, Note, The Answer, My Friends, Is in the Wind Rights Contract Act: Proposed
Legislation Governing Wind Rights Contracts, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1775, 1784 (2004); Choctaw,
O. & T. R.R Co. v. True, 80 S.W. 120, 121 (Tex. Civ. App. 1904). For other valuable
articles addressing wind rights, without as much emphasis on the categorization of the
right, see Helle Tegner Anker et al., Wind Energy and the Law: A Comparative Analysis,
27 J. ENERGY & NAT. RES. L. 145, 146 (2009); Elizabeth Burleson, Wind Power, National
Security, and Sound Energy Policy, 17 PENN ST. ENV’T L. REV. 137, 138 (2009); Bent Ole
Gram Mortensen, International Experiences of Wind Energy, 2 ENV’T & ENERGY L. & POL’Y
J. 179, 209 (2008); K. Shawn Smallwood, Wind Power Company Compliance with Mitigation
Plans in the Altamont Pass Wind Resource Area, 2 ENV’T & ENERGY L. & POL’Y J. 229, 233
(2008); Roderick E. Wetsel & H. Alan Carmichael, Current Issues in Wind Energy Law
2009 at the State Bar of Texas 20th Annual Advanced Real Estate Drafting Course
(Mar. 5–6, 2009); Ernest E. Smith, Roderick E. Wetsel, Becky H. Diffen, & Melissa
Powers, WIND LAW § 4.01 (LexisNexis 2020).
232. See, e.g., Marc Howe, Chinese Regional Government Claims Wind Energy Is “StateOwned”, WINDPOWER MONTHLY (June 19, 2012), https://www.windpower
monthly.com/article/1136930 [https://perma.cc/WG3U-A5LR] (explaining Article
9 of China’s constitution was interpreted to mean that wind and solar energy are stateowned resources).
233. See, e.g., DuVivier, Sins, supra note 231, at 412 (explaining that there is not a
firm legal standard as to if private property also includes the wind of that property).
234. DuVivier & Mooney, supra note 207, at 19.
235. Id. at 22.
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wind regulations.236 Offshore leasing in the United Kingdom is
regulated by the Crown Estate, which is an independent commercial
business created by an Act of Parliament to manage the development
of wind, as well as minerals, cables, and pipelines in the seabed around
England, Wales, and Northern Ireland.237 The Crown Estate requires
five-kilometer setbacks for all of its leases, resulting in up to ten
kilometers of undeveloped area between adjacent leases.238 A handful
of U.S. offshore leases now also have a similar, albeit smaller,
designated setback.239
The problem with the moat solution is two-fold. First, it leaves
undeveloped large areas that potentially could otherwise be productive
for wind energy development.240 Consequently, these moats do not
economically or efficiently utilize the wind resource. Second, it is
underinclusive as some turbines have negative impacts that extend
beyond the distances set.241 These issues will only continue to be
236. Id. at 32, 45.
237. Introducing Offshore Wind Leasing Round 4, THE CROWN ESTATE (Sept. 2019),
2019),
https://www.thecrownestate.co.uk/media/3321/tce-r4-informationmemorandum.pdf [https://perma.cc/672W-X2U2]; see also THE CROWN ESTATE,
OFFSHORE WIND NEW LEASING MARKET ENGAGEMENT EVENT 10 (2018),
https://www.thecrownestate.co.uk/media/2797/20181126-new-leasing-engagementevent-slides-published.pdf [https://perma.cc/QC33-QV33].
238. E-mail from Ben Barton, Senior Com. Manager for the Crown Est., to Karina
Condra, Reference Libr., U. Denv. July (July 12, 2019); see The Crown Est., Offshore
Wind New Leasing at the OSW Market Engagement Event (Nov. 26, 2018). 26, 2018).
The latest U.K. developments in the new Round 4 tender process are now required to
have a 7.5 kilometer buffer unless an existing project provides its consent for a closer
proximity. Memorandum from The Crown Est. on Introducing Offshore Wind Leasing
Round 4 (Sept. 2019), https://www.thecrownestate.co.uk/media/3321/tce-r4information-memorandum.pdf; see E-mail from Ben Barton, Senior Com. Manager for
the Crown Est., to Karina Condra, Reference Libr., U. Denver (Mar. 2, 2021) (on file
with author).
239. See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Commercial Lease of Submerged Lands for
Renewable Energy Development on the Continental Shelf, OCEAN ENERGY MGMT. BUREAU, at
C-17 add. C (2019), https://www.boem.gov/sites/default/files/renewable-energyprogram/State-Activities/MA/Lease-OCS-A-0520.pdf [https://perma.cc/L8HA2AE5] (“In its COP project design, the Lessee must incorporate a 750 m setback from
any shared lease boundary within which the Lessee may not construct any surface
structures, unless the Lessee and the adjacent lessee agree to a smaller setback, the
Lessee submits such agreement to BOEM, and BOEM approves it.”).
240. See, e.g., RULE, CONFLICTS, supra note 206, at 50–51 (describing, with
illustrations and economics, a waivable setback proposal).
241. See DuVivier & Mooney, supra note 207 at 19, 26 &n.158 (explaining wakes can
have significant impacts up to sixty kilometers away; standard setbacks are only five to
ten RD).
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problematic as the United States increasingly invests in wind
development projects.
D. Better Solution to Wind Waste: Cooperative Development
Wind energy has never had the luxury of a legal regime created to
address its unique attributes. Instead, it has been wrested into regimes
established to meet other needs or resources.242 For example, Congress
passed the Federal Land Policy and Management Act243 (FLPMA) in
1976, before current wind energy technologies. To accommodate wind
power development in the 1980s, federal officials employed FLPMA
right-of-way authority for permitting onshore wind energy projects.244
Generally, the FLPMA authority had previously been used for linear
developments such as transmission lines, not for fields of resource
development like wind.245
Offshore wind faced even more hurdles than onshore due to a lack
of clear statutory authority to allow development. Federal officials’
hands were tied without statutory permission, comparable to the
FLPMA right-of-way for federal lands, to issue permits or leases for
wind energy projects in federal waters.246 The OCS Lands Act,247 passed
in 1953, authorized the Secretary of the Interior to grant any oil, gas,
or mineral leases on submerged lands of the outer continental shelf.248
Yet, there was nothing that permitted wind energy projects until the
Energy Policy Act of 2005249 updated some of the provisions of the
Energy Policy Act of 1992250 to address wind energy production.251 The

242. See, e.g., DuVivier, Sins, supra note 231, at 411 (examining the parallels between
oil and gas severance compared to the wind industry).
243. Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-579, 90 Stat.
2744.
244. David J. Lazerwitz, Renewable Energy Development on the Federal Public Lands:
Catching Up with the New Land Rush, 55 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 13-1, 13-8 (2009).
245. See id. at 13-7 (discussing how the FPLMA has “historically focused on
providing noncompetitive ‘rights-of-way’ . . . for roads, pipelines, and transmission”).
246. 43 U.S.C. § 1761(a) (2018).
247. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-212, 67 Stat. 462
(1953).
248. Id. § 4(a)(1).
249. Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (2005).
250. Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776 (1992).
251. Section 388(a) of 2005 Energy Policy Act amended Section 8 of the Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act to authorize the Secretary of the Interior to lease
submerged lands “[in] support [of] production, transportation, or transmission of
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Secretary of the Interior subsequently delegated the authority to
regulate offshore wind activities to the Bureau of Ocean Management
(BOEM) and the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement
(BSEE).252
The lack of a statutory regime specifically for onshore wind may have
contributed to its slow uptake on federal lands: as of early 2019, federal
lands represented about five percent of all U.S. wind energy capacity
onshore.253 However, the current statutory structure for offshore wind
may provide a vehicle for maximizing offshore wind development
without having to address the pesky wind ownership issue and allowing
offshore development to fall into the wasteful competitive and
protective production patterns that characterize much current
onshore wind.254
As noted above, in the oil and gas context, the OCS Lands Act
promotes both correlative rights and conservation of all-natural
energy from sources other than oil and gas.” Id. § 388(a)) (codified as amended at 43
U.S.C. § 1337(p)(1) (C) (2005)) (emphasis added).
252. Originally, the Secretary delegated the leasing and management authority to
the Minerals Management Service (MMS), which at that time also administered the
OCS oil and gas leasing process. However, the federal government grew concerned
that MMS, which controlled both leasing and safety as well as revenue generation, had
a conflict of interest that may have contributed to the Macondo Well blowout from the
Deepwater Horizon oil rig in April 2010. So, the BLM reorganized MMS to separate
the two functions. The Office of Natural Resources Revenue controls royalty payments.
A new agency, the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and
Enforcement (BOEMRE) was created to control leasing and safety. BOEMRE was
further divided into the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management and the Bureau of
Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE). HENRY B. HOGUE, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., R41485, REORGANIZATION OF THE MINERALS MANAGEMENT SERVICE IN THE
AFTERMATH OF THE DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL 1–14 (2010); see also Secretarial
Order 3071 (Jan. 19, 1982) (codified at 30 C.F.R. § 1201 (1982)) (giving MMS
authority over offshore leasing); 30 C.F.R. § 585.100 (2019); Memorandum of
Understanding between the U.S. Dep’t of the Interior and Fed. Energy Reg.
Commission (Apr. 9, 2009), https://www.boem.gov/Renewable-Energy-Program/
DOI_FERC_MOU.aspx [https://perma.cc/ZG87-6GBZ] (FERC permits marine
hydrokinetic (wave and tidal) through its license process, while BOEM issues leases if
they are on the OCS. BOEM has exclusive jurisdiction for leasing and permitting wind
on the OCS).
253. BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., WIND ENERGY, https://www.blm.gov/programs/
energy-and-minerals/renewable-energy/wind-energy [https://perma.cc/E2TYKTJ2]. Other factors have contributed, such as the lack of clear agency policies and
NEPA requirements. See, e.g., Lazerwitz, supra note 244, at 13-6, 13-7; Irma S. Russell,
Streamlining NEPA to Combat Global Climate Change: Heresy or Necessity?, 39 ENVT’L L. 1049,
1051 (2009).
254. See supra notes 8, 244–49 and accompanying text.
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resources, not just the mineral resources.255 By granting wind leases,
the government is granting each lessee a right to harvest a valuable
interest in the wind’s energy.256 Through its regulations and
management, the federal government has found a balance between
protecting the correlative rights of its lessees while also maximizing
development of its offshore oil and gas resources.257 As discussed in this
Section, this balance can be achieved primarily by the federal
government’s use of regulations and unitization-like approaches to
maximize the development of American off-shore wind resources. This
Section addresses how the federal government can use comparable
regulations and unitization-like approaches to maximize development
of U.S. offshore wind resources.258
The federal regulatory definition of “waste” in the OCS Lands Act
only addresses oil, gas, and sulphur—not wind.259 However, the
government must ensure that offshore wind leasing and development
are carried out in a manner that provides for, inter alia, “(C) [the]
prevention of waste [and] . . . (G) [the] protection of correlative rights
in the outer Continental Shelf.”260 Although many judges eschew
legislative history, section § 1337(p)(4) was first proposed as the
“Alternative Energy-Related Uses on the Outer Continental Shelf”
amendment to the 2005 Energy Policy Act.261 The current list of
required considerations was not in the original bill and appears to have
been gleaned from proposed legislation that the Department of the
Interior had suggested years before.262 With respect to waste and
correlative rights, the factors enacted closely mirror the offshore oil

255. See supra notes 154–92 and accompanying text.
256. See Elizabeth Weise, Wind Energy gives American Farmers a New Crop to Sell in Tough
Times, USA TODAY (Feb. 16, 2020), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/
2020/02/16/wind-energy-can-help-american-farmers-earn-money-avoid-bankruptcy/
4695670002 [https://perma.cc/LEJ8-ZK3X].
257. See supra notes 115–27 and accompanying text.
258. Yael R. Lifshitz, The Geometry of Property, 71 UNIV. TORONTO L.J., 480 (2021).
Using a broader definition of unitization in the wind context: “[T]he important point
is that unitization essentially aggregates entitlements from multiple vertical rightholders into a unified horizontal regime. It overcomes the spatial misalignment in that
sense. Applying this notion to wind would entail setting up a mechanism for pooling
the rights of multiple landowners into a unified management of wind over a given
area.” Id. at 36–37.
259. See supra notes 156–57 and accompanying text.
260. 43 U.S.C. § 1337(p)(4) (2018).
261. Pub. L. No. 109-58, sec. 388, 119 Stat. 594, 744 (2005)).
262. See, e.g., 151 Cong. Rec. S6834, S6865 (2005).
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and gas provisions of 43 U.S.C. 1334(a).263 Therefore, while the same
word may have different meanings in different contexts, this analysis
will apply federal oil and gas waste law to wind energy development
and suggest a possible addition to 30 C.F.R. to ensure that the nascent
U.S. offshore wind industry grows in a collaborative, rather than a
wasteful way.264
The above discussion of waste as defined by the federal oil and gas
regulation focused on four elements: (1) “dissipation of reservoir
energy”; (2) “reduction in the quantity of resource ultimately
recoverable”; (3) “production in excess of reasonable market
demand”; and (4) “drilling of unnecessary wells.”265 Item one of this
list—dissipation of reservoir energy—is unique to how oil and gas
reservoirs are developed. Consequently, it has no application in the
context of wind energy development. Similarly, item three on this
list—production in excess of reasonable market demand—primarily
addresses private financial interests. The current federal regulation for
oil and gas does not include it, and there is no reason for wind energy
development to include it either.
Therefore, this Section will address the remaining two elements of
waste in the above list: (1) reduction in the quantity of resource
ultimately recoverable and (2) the wind development equivalent of
drilling unnecessary wells—building unnecessary infrastructure. In
addition, this discussion will show that concerns about item (1)
indicate too few turbines may be constructed, and item (2) indicates
that there may be situations when, ironically, too many have been
erected and are no longer performing to their capacity because of
adjacent development.
1. Reduction in the quantity of resource ultimately recoverable
Section II.A.2 above addressed ways in which oil and gas resources
have been rendered unrecoverable by the development practices of
one operator or another. Lessors, specifically the U.S. government in
the context of offshore oil and gas development, have several

263. Id.
264. United States ex rel. Chi., N.Y. & Boston Refrigerator Co. v. Interstate Com.
Comm’n, 265 U.S. 292, 295 (1924) (“[B]ecause words used in one statute have a
particular meaning they do not necessarily denote an identical meaning when used in
another and different statute.”).
265. Supra notes 153–62 and accompanying text (analyzing 30 C.F.R. §§ 250.105,
550.105).
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incentives for maximizing recovery of these resources.266 First,
assuming their development benefits society, then the more that is
recovered, the greater the benefit.267 Second, the United States
receives royalties based on the amount of resource recovered, so
maximizing recovery also maximizes this royalty-payment benefit for
the American people.268
One of the primary ways that the U.S. government has ensured
maximization of the quantity of oil and gas recovered from its offshore
leases is through cooperative agreements or unitization.269 Cooperative
development of oil and gas resources has resulted in the most efficient
and economical development and dramatically improved recovery
rates.270 Consequently, Congress granted U.S. regulatory agencies the
authority to mandate that separate lessees enter agreements to develop
their offshore interests cooperatively.271
Energy recovery of U.S. offshore wind resources would also be
maximized by allowing regulatory agencies to mandate cooperative
development and to control turbine locations.272 As explained in
266. See supra notes 40–52, 66–73 and accompanying text.
267. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Quadrennial Technology Review 2015: Oil and Gas
Technologies, Chapter 7: Advancing Systems and Technologies to Produce Cleaner Fuels, 1
(2015).
268. Waste Prevention, Production Subject to Royalties, and Resource
Conservation, 81 Fed. Reg. 83,008, 83,041 (Nov. 18, 2016) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R.
§ 3103.3-1).
269. See supra Section II.A.2 (discussing cooperative agreements and unitization).
270. See supra notes 121–24 and accompanying text.
271. 43 U.S.C. § 1334(j)(2).
272. For many wind developers, the ultimate goal is to maximize profits, and this
goal may align with maximizing recovery, i.e., the number of gigawatt hours a wind
plant produces, but there may be other factors that come into play such as costs for
bonus payments, rents, royalties, cable construction, cable losses, the expenses to
install each turbine (purchase price, deep borings, foundation, installation),
production per turbine, site investigation costs, and operation and maintenance.
Developers face a fundamental dilemma when planning the layout of their wind farms
to maximize production and minimize losses. Because more turbines mean more
opportunities to generate electricity, developers might be tempted to site many
turbines with closer spacing. Yet, waking between turbines that are too closely spaced
can reduce the average production of each turbine and create more equipment
damage, with its related costs. Modeling will be needed to help developers determine
the best tradeoffs within a development area to avoid underperformance due to
waking, which in some cases has been up to forty percent, representing a lot of lost
energy and high costs for the industry. David Glickson, High-Tech Tools Tackle Wind
Farm Performance, NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB’Y (Sept. 20, 2012), https://
www.nrel.gov/news/features/2012/1995.html
[https://perma.cc/6L3V-MJBU];
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Section IV.A above, neighboring U.S. onshore wind farms have
impacted one another by damaging nearby equipment and “stealing”
from downwind farms recoverable energy that could have been
converted to electricity.273 The lack of regulation from governmental
agencies and absence of a clear property rights regime to address the
problem have incentivized many developers to create protective
“moats” of turbine-free swaths of lands around their projects that could
otherwise have been used to exploit the available energy in the wind
and convert it to electricity.274
To avoid this waste, the United States, as the lessor, should create a
cooperative development system. Such a system would not exactly
follow the unitization mechanisms used for oil and gas development
because wind is not contained in geologic traps similar to those
defining conventional oil and gas deposits. However, ocean wind
currents are generally more predictable than land currents, and
modeling could define expected patterns and potential optimal
turbine layout patterns.275
In U.S. offshore oil and gas operations, the federal government will
often stop short of a full unitization order, which would require the
parties to have a single operator and share all decision-making, costs,
and revenues.276 Instead, wind regulations could borrow from oil and
gas requiring lessees to share early development plans with adjacent
developers, and the federal government could review and approve
turbine layouts. As with oil and gas, a key component would be

MATTHEW J. CHURCHFIELD ET AL., A LARGE-EDDY SIMULATION OF WIND-PLANT
AERODYNAMICS 2 (2012), https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy12osti/53554.pdf [https://
perma.cc/UE8E-MQ24].
273. See supra Section III.C. Without legal recourse for lost revenue or incentives for
collaborative planning with neighboring wind farms, developers are faced with a
“tragedy of the commons” type dilemma and are incentivized to maximize their own
gains at the expense of downwind farms.
274. See DuVivier & Mooney, supra note 207, at 2.
275. See W. MUSIAL ET AL., NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB’Y, ASSESSMENT OF OFFSHORE
WIND ENERGY LEASING AREAS FOR THE BOEM MASSACHUSETTS WIND ENERGY AREA, , 1, 12
(2013), https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy14osti/60942.pdf [https://perma.cc/42STLHCG]. But cf. id. at 23 (observing that while many offshore sites have prevailing winds
in one direction, the mid-Atlantic states experience “more bimodal [offshore] wind
direction distributions” resulting in “projects [that] may experience relatively higher
wake losses and more difficultly in optimizing array layouts for power production.”).
276. See Dana E. Dupre, What Makes the United States Offshore Leasing System So Special?
A Primer on the Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Lease, 4 LSU J. ENERGY L. RESOURCES
37, 49–50 (2015).
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recognizing the correlative rights of all owners in the unit and
allocating each a share of revenues for production even if a turbine is
not located on a particular owner’s lease.277
Although requiring cooperation for turbine locations up to and
across lease boundaries might maximize recovery, an alternative
approach might increase recovery in situations where the lease
agreements require setbacks or moats around lease boundaries as in
the U.K. Crown leases and some U.S. leases.278 While some of these
setbacks are waivable, the default is no development in these setback
areas, resulting in no electricity generation from this acreage.279 In
contrast, the federal government might retain the setbacks but create
a system of notifying adjacent leaseholders of potential development
in a setback area. Then the downwind developer might construct a
turbine there and exercise an option to pay the upwind developer for
the expected loss of electricity generation from a turbine on the
upwind lease.280 Yet another option might be to share costs and
revenues from turbines in the buffer zones rather than sharing with
the entire acreage of the leases.
A second consideration in determining the “quantity of resource
ultimately recoverable” is that the federal regulation includes a
“prudent operator” standard.281 Interestingly, so far in the nascent U.S.
offshore wind-leasing context, this has played out to reduce the
number of turbines that might be installed without any compensation
for losses that might otherwise be considered waste.282 Specifically,
when wind developers in Rhode Island and Massachusetts first
submitted plans to BOEM, they proposed a spacing of 0.7 miles for

277. As wind collection technologies evolve from turbines to kite-like mechanisms,
it may be more important than ever for the government to think in terms of a
horizontal regime for extracting the airborne kinetic energy instead of adhering to a
vertical, lease by lease vertical regime based on the infrastructure used to collect this
resource. See generally Yael R. Lifshitz, The Geometry of Property, UNIV. TORONTO L.J., 1, 3–
7 (Forthcoming).
278. See supra Section IV.C.
279. See DuVivier & Mooney, supra note 207, at 28.
280. See DuVivier, supra note 230, at 26–28. Rather than drilling an offset well,
neighboring oil and gas operators sometimes agree to compensatory royalties when a
well is drilled on adjacent acreage. See Troy A. Rule, Airspace in a Green Economy,
59 UCLA L. REV. 270, 305–06 (2011) (describing the economics of a sample waivable
wake setback).
281. See supra notes 125–26 and accompanying text.
282. See infra notes 283–85 and accompanying text.
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their turbines to optimize electricity production from their leases.283
However, to address concerns of the fishing industry, these developers
agreed instead to space their turbines one mile apart.284 This
compromise sacrificed thirty percent of the energy production, or up
to twelve gigawatts of electricity that could have been produced. This
compromise also may have inadvertently created a new industry
standard, suggesting that a prudent operator not facing the same
pressure to compromise would choose to develop at a less-dense
spacing than necessary to maximize recovery.285
One reason the 2016 Waste Prevention Rules were vacated was that
a federal judge in Wyoming was concerned with detrimental reliance
by oil and gas operators when “an agency’s new policy ‘rests upon
factual findings that contradict those which underlay its prior
policy.’”286 No such reliance is a factor in the context of offshore wind
as the industry is in its infancy. It is a “new policy created on a blank
slate,” and BOEM reasonably should recognize that such spacing
compromises represent waste of the full resource. Noise287 and
operational restrictions to mitigate impacts on protected species288 will
also likely prevent full development of the wind energy resource.
Consequently, while BOEM recognizes its analysis creates “significant
reductions in the[] resulting area available for offshore wind
development” and “does not maximize the potential wind energy
produced,”289 it does not yet calculate the monetary value of the wind
283. BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., TRANSCRIPT OF VINEYARD WIND SEIS PUBLIC
MEETING DAY 2, 1, 100–01 (June 30, 2020), https://www.boem.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/renewable-energy/Vineyard%20Wind%20SEIS%20Pub.%20Mtg.%
20Day%202.pdf [https://perma.cc/HM6T-AX3C] (Testimony of Ian Clayton).
284. Letter from Equinor Wind, Eversource Energy, Mayflower Wing, Orsted North
America, and Vineyard Wind to Michael Emerson, U.S. Coast Guard (Nov. 1, 2019),
in 3 DRAFT CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATIONS PLAN, app. III-P (2020).
285. See supra note 283.
286. Wyoming v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 493 F. Supp. 3d 1046, 1084 (D. Wyo.
2020) (quoting FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009)).
287. Whales are sensitive to noise, so restrictions on pile driving foundations can
impact the pace of construction. Helen Bailey et al., Assessing Underwater Noise Levels
During Pile-Driving at an Offshore Windfarm and its Potential Effects on Marine Mammals, 60
MARINE POLLUTION BULL. 888, 891 (2010).
288. Onshore wind developments have operational restrictions under the
Endangered Species Act and the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act to protect
birds and bats. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–44; 16 U.S.C. § 668–668d.
289. Information Memorandum at 16 (May 10, 2021). https://www.boem.gov/
sites/default/files/documents/renewable-energy/state-activities/VW1-OCSLACompliance-Memo-ROD-Appendix-B.pdf.
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resource lost when balancing all the factors required for approval of a
project.290
2. Building unnecessary infrastructure
The Model Act and several state statutes include the “drilling of
unnecessary wells” within their definitions of “waste” of oil and gas.291
Similarly, some federal officials have used their discretion to designate
unnecessary wells as waste even though this language is not explicitly
included in the definition of waste under the federal regulations.292
One rationale for considering excess wells as waste is the added
expense to private-party holders of correlative rights to erect offset
wells when these wells do not ultimately increase the overall recovery
from a reservoir. While this is a private concern, drilling only necessary
wells also has several public impacts including (1) minimizing impacts
on marine life; (2) reducing potential sources of pollution; and (3)
preventing diversion of scarce equipment and expert manpower from
more productive uses.293
As discussed in Section IV.B above, subsequent development of
upwind farms has significantly impacted preexisting downwind farms,
rendering them non-economic because the energy they had relied
upon for paying back their initial costs has now been stolen.294 The
Texas study showed the downwind farm lost revenue and production
tax credits of almost three- million dollars annually, and in the North
Sea the efficiency of the Nysted wind project dropped twenty-one
percent after installation of the Rødsand II project upwind.295 When
newer upwind developers have no liability for their impact on an
existing downwind farm, they have no incentive to coordinate or
compensate impacted downwind turbines.296 The result is, at worst,
closure of the preexisting downwind farm, or at least, significantly
more infrastructure—in terms of turbines, connected wiring,
290. Id. (quoting Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. at 509).
291. See supra notes 140–41 and accompanying text.
292. See supra notes 177–81 and accompanying text.
293. See supra notes 194–96 and accompanying text.
294. See supra notes 220–24 and accompanying text.
295. K.K. DuVivier, Can Political Headwinds against U.S. Offshore Wind Power Help
Policy Change Course?, CTR. PROGRESSIVE REFORM (Mar. 19, 2020), http://
progressivereform.org/cpr-blog/can-political-headwinds-against-us-offshore-windpower-help-policy-change-course [https://perma.cc/NQ2U-73K8]; see also Lundquist
et al., supra note 206, at 26–27; Nicolai Gayle Nygaard, Wakes in Very Large Wind Farms
and the Effect of Neighbouring Wind Farms, 524 J. PHYSICS: CONF. SERIES 1, 9 (2014).
296. See DuVivier & Mooney, supra note 207, at 21, 26, 28.
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substations, etc.—to exploit the same or a roughly equivalent amount
of wind energy in an area.297
The rationales for recognizing the building of this unnecessary
infrastructure as “waste” mirror those for unnecessary oil and gas wells.
On a private level, developers are investing more to develop the same
amount of energy.298 On a public level, more turbines than necessary
create more opportunities to interfere with marine life and other OCS
uses of the area, including fishing.299 While more turbines may not be
as great a risk of pollution as more oil and gas wells that could create
spills, there still is more potential for pollution with each site.300 Finally,
and perhaps most importantly, each turbine represents costs to society
for manufacturing the base, tower, blades, gears, and generators,
which require the mining of source parts, including mining of rare
earths, and the need for recycling or disposing of all of this equipment
when they reach the end of their life cycle.301
Regulators could address this issue by recognizing, as some
European countries have done, the value of the wind energy to the
existing wind farm and requiring compensation for losses.302 In
addition, the government forces oil and gas operators to share
pipelines and platforms, and regulators could mandate similar sharing
for transmission lines and some other wind project infrastructure.303

297. Id. at 12, 13, 16–20.
298. David E. Pierce, Minimizing the Environmental Impact of Oil and Gas Development
by Maximizing Production Conservation, 85 N.D.L. REV. 759, 760–61, 769–70 (2009).
299. See supra notes 281–85 and accompanying text.
300. OFFICE OF ENERGY EFFICIENCY AND RENEWABLE ENERGY, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS
AND SITING OF WIND PROJECTS, https://www.energy.gov/eere/wind/environmentalimpacts-and-siting-wind-projects [https://perma.cc/G7ZY-C39D].
301. See U.S. Energy Information Administration, Average U.S. Construction Costs for
Solar and Wind Generation Continue to Fall (Sept. 16, 2020), https://
www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=45136 [https://perma.cc/2WED-HPTU].
302. See DuVivier & Mooney supra note 297, at 30–32 (describing the Danish and
British governments’ differing approaches to compensating existing wind farm owners
for losses as a result of newer developments).
303. Texas Rice Land Partners, Ltd. v. Denbury Green Pipeline-Tex., LLC, 363
S.W.3d 192, 200, 202 (Tex. 2012)(holding that the eminent domain clause of the
Texas Constitution only allows a taking for pipeline construction if the pipeline is for
public use and there is a “reasonable probability” that the pipeline will be used to carry
oil or gas for another party other than the one constructing the pipeline).
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CONCLUSION
The United States has vast offshore wind resources—nearly double
the total electricity consumption of the country—located near some of
the largest population centers, and therefore, electricity load,
centers.304 This abundance has remained untapped for over a decade,
putting the United States behind its peers worldwide. Yet, a more
urgent focus on climate change and President Biden’s executive order
promise to bring on an unprecedented rush of offshore wind
development in U.S. waters.
While the United States is a world leader in onshore wind energy,
that development has come at the price of heavy waste of the resource.
Under a common law rule of capture like the one applied in the early
days of oil and gas development, individual wind developers have an
incentive to maximize energy recovery within their own wind farms,
but they have no incentive to maximize recovery of the entire resource.
Uniformity of ownership by the federal government should facilitate
consistent, cooperative wind development that is not possible on land
because of the competing priorities of different owners. Lessons
learned from common law waste and state oil and gas waste statutes, as
well as federal regulations on the topic, can inform the promulgation
of regulations that will best facilitate the development of offshore wind.
Specifically, two criteria should guide offshore wind development—
maximizing the quantity of resource recoverable and avoiding the
construction of unnecessary infrastructure to harvest it.
There is even more reason in this context than in the oil and gas
context to maximize recovery of the entire U.S. offshore wind
resource. While maximizing an oil and gas field simply contributes
more greenhouse-gas-producing product, maximizing carbon-free
energy production benefits the U.S. public, as well as the world, by
helping mitigate climate change. Furthermore, offshore wind on
federal lands is an asset collectively owned by all U.S. citizens, and
maximizing production can generate maximum payments to the
public.305

304. Liz Hartman, Computing America’s Offshore Wind Energy Potential, OFFICE OF
ENERGY EFFICIENCY AND RENEWABLE ENERGY (Sept. 9, 2016), https://www.energy.gov/
eere/articles/computing-america-s-offshore-wind-energy-potential [https://perma.c
c/9B9P-KRMS].
305. In the oil and gas setting, these payments might be royalties, but with wind
energy, the public receives lease auction payments, rents, and operating fees.
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As with oil and gas development, regulation of wind is required to
prevent waste and to force consideration of the correlative rights of
other developers in a common pool. Recognizing the value of wind
energy losses by construction of upwind farms or in the context of
spacing compromises, and ultimately, utilizing cooperative
development in the form of resource-wide development plans, spacing
rules, and providing shared returns for turbines along lease
boundaries may be some of the best solutions for preventing wind
waste.

